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Summary
Chapter 2 analyzes the political economy of delayed agreements over fiscal reforms,
in a setting where two interest groups can bargain over the allocation of the cost of the
stabilization, using an alternating offers model. This contrasts with Alesina and Drazen
(1991), where the group that concedes earlier bears a fixed disproportionate share of the
burden. This allows a systematic comparison of expected delay in the bargaining game,
i.e., “the coalition government” and in the concession game, i.e., “the divided government”.
When interest groups are sufficiently patient, or when shares in the concession game are
highly unequal, agreement is reached more quickly on average under bargaining. Both
games have the common feature that delay signals the “toughness” of interest groups.
Chapter 3 compares default incentives in competitive sovereign debt markets when
leaders can be either democratically elected or dictators. When leaders can be replaced,
the incentives for repayment are mainly the ego rents from office. In a dictatorship, the
cost of defaulting is the permanent loss of reputation and the loss of future access to credit.
There is a trade off between repayment and risk sharing under the state-contingent optimal
contracts. We show that when ego rents are high and value of reputation to dictators is
low, democracies have an incentive to repay more in good states and repay less in bad
states. Thus the democratic leader defaults more often, improving risk-sharing.
Chapter 4 examines the political economy of sovereign debt crises, using newly es-
tablished data from 81 countries between 1975 and 2010. The empirical results validate
that political factors matter for debt sustainability. I find that in a democracy, the par-
liamentary system is less likely to reschedule their external debt than a presidency, while
rescheduling propensity of a country is increased by political instability. Also results show
that public creditors (The Paris Club) tend to give a “democratic advantage” as a foreign
assistance to democratic countries, in contrast with private creditors (The London Club).
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until
the voters discover that they can vote themselves largesse from the public treasury. From
that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits
from the public treasury with the result that a democracy always collapses over a loose fiscal
policy, always followed by a dictatorship, then a monarchy.”
– Alexander Fraser Tytler, a British lawyer, 1747-1813
“There is no such thing as a good tax.”
– Winston Churchill, a British politician, 1874-1965
Fiscal policy has been playing an essential role to stabilize aggregate demand, deter-
mine the pattern of resource allocation and the income distribution, and promote the
socio-economic development. The main instruments of fiscal management are government
spending and taxation. Changes in the level and composition of government spending and
1
taxation can have a significant impact on the economy. While these policy instruments
have been used since ancient Greek and Roman times, the economic model developed by
Keynes (1936) has been adopted in various forms since the World War II era. In terms
of stabilization function, governments try to maintain a countercyclical fiscal stance by
keeping a constant level of expenditures and constant tax rates, which helps consumers
smooth their own consumption. The standard economics textbook explains that these
consumption smoothing attempts result in fiscal deficits, based on Barro (1979).
One of the most striking macroeconomic developments during the last few decades is
the rise and persistence of large fiscal deficits in a number of countries, and the increase in
the number of sovereign debt default (Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)). Despite recent major
fiscal reforms all over the world, many countries have suffered from recurrent large fiscal
imbalances that often reflect lack of fiscal discipline, and faced fiscal crises, most notably
the Eurozone crisis beginning in the late 2009. As a result of delays in fiscal reforms (e.g.,
attempts to reduce tax evasion), the Greek government faced a debt crisis in 2010. In order
to secure bailout funds from foreign lenders, they had to accept the fiscal consolidation
plan proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU),
which forced the Greek government to decrease civil wages by more than 30%, cut pension
benefits, and reduce the number of civil servants by 15,000. While those measures ended up
reducing annual expenditure on wages by over one-third, unemployment rates skyrocketed
to more than 27%, and interest rates went up over 30%.
The fact that governments tend to accumulate debt above levels that could be plausibly
explained by consumption smoothing theories has been well documented (Alesina and
Perotti (1995)). Among others, the possible explanation of accumulating fiscal debts could
be the influence of political considerations on fiscal policy making. Fiscal policy ultimately
aims to spend money, which is collected from citizens through taxation. Since taxation is
2
a relatively visible burden to citizens, the decision is more likely to be affected by political
considerations as well as economic considerations, compared to monetary policy. Even
beyond political incentives, tax issues have often been highlighted for fundamental political
principles – For instance, we could easily see a slogan of “Taxation without representation”
on all vehicle license plates in Washington D.C.1
The literature on the political economy of fiscal policy is very large, and dates back to
the nineteenth century with the Italian school of public finance (Buchanan (1960)). Most
of the earlier literatures from the 1970s and 1980s were done by James Buchanan and
his associates, such as Buchanan and Wagner (1977) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
Their explanation of why governments run fiscal deficits is mainly based upon the notions of
“fiscal illusion” and voter’s irrationality. They emphasize the opportunistic manipulation
of government spending by incumbant policy makers, who would try to improve their
chances to get re-elected. Under these circumstances, voters are assumed to appreciate
government expenditure, in articilar its expansionary macroeconomic consequences, but
consistently underestimate its costs in a form of future burden.
In the 1990s, however, these literatures have been criticized because of the assumption
that voters make consistent mistakes (Alesina and Perotti (1995)). Therefore, there is
a tendency to see different lines of theoretical argument about the motivations behind
accumulation of debts, with the assumption that the time horizon and discount factor of
politicians coincide with those of the economy, and voters behave rationally with perfect
information.
Alesina and Tabellini (1990), for example, models deficits as a strategic variable to
1Washington D.C. vehicle authorities encourage all D.C. residents to support D.C.’s quest for full repre-
sentation in the U.S. Congress by displaying this slogan on their vehicle license plates. All new registrants
receive “Taxation without Representation” tags automatically unless requested otherwise.
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“tie the hands of successors” with different fiscal preferences. Under a democracy where
government debt is used strategically by policymakers with different preferences, in order
to influence the choices of their successors, debt accumulation is likely to be higher than
that of optimal composition by a social planner. In other words, it could be caused by
the voters’ disagreement, rather than their myopic actions. The larger the equilibrium
level of debt in the model is, the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating
governments, and the less likely it is that the incumbent government will be re-elected.
Alternatively, distributional conflicts within social groups have also been used to explain
why fiscal deficits are accumulated even if they are recognized as being necessarily adjusted.
A seminal paper, Alesina and Drazen (1991) models the decision on fiscal adjustments as a
‘war of attrition’ between groups that decides which will bear the costs of the adjustment.
The adjustment occurs when one group makes a decision to accept to pay these costs, with
the judgment that its additional tax payments related to further delay would exceed its
benefits from waiting further for the other to concede. As discussed in chapter two, these
models of delayed adjustment suggest that the probability of an adjustment to take place
in a timely manner would decrease with the level of fragmentation and polarization, as the
parties have a larger incentive to wait under higher polarization.
Considering the above, democratic governments do not necessarily provide ideal circum-
stances to ensure optimal policy outcomes. Rather, the empirical literature on democracy
and economic development of the last few decades fails to arrive at a clear answer on the
relationship (Brunetti (1997)).2 Further, Bardhan (1993) suggests that the theoretical re-
lationship between democracy and growth itself is ambiguous, while Sah (1991) has argued
that authoritarian regimes exhibit a larger variance in economic performance than democ-
2Of the seventeen papers reviewed in Brunetti (1997) that empirically examine the democracy-growth
relationship, nine find no effects, four find positive effects, and the other four find negative effects.
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racies. Depending on the composition of the voters, democracies may be more susceptible
to pressures for immediate consumption that could hamper long-run investment. On the
other hand, authoritarian leaders, who have the sufficient capacity to cope with such pres-
sures, may instead be self-aggrandizing. In fact, the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes
could be sustained by providing economic stability, or rapid growth in some cases.
Furthermore, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) suggest that the pressing needs of govern-
ments to reduce debt rollover risks and curb rising interest expenditures are leading to a
revival of “financial repression”, which had its peak during the heaviliy regulated Bretton
Woods system. The mechanism of “financial repression” described in Reinhart and Ro-
goff (2011) is that more directed lending to governments by captive domestic audiences,
explicit or implicit caps on interest rates under a mild inflation, and tighter regulation on
cross-border capital movements would result in debt reduction. Needless to say, traditional
approaches on fiscal consolidation is to cut expenditures or increase taxes. Therefore, this
evolution may imply that in the wake of the Eurozone crisis and “fiscal cliff” in the U.S., the
feasibility to implement classical fiscal adjustments in a timely manner has been questioned
under recent democracies.
A natural question then is if democracies may not help avoid fiscal crises, including
sovereign default, which system is better off? Given democratic countries are not likely
to revert to autocracy, it is necessary to address how the difference in democratic systems
affects the decisions on fiscal reforms and sovereign debt default. Hence, this essay theoret-
ically and empirically investigates how fiscal policy is formulated in the context of political
economy, focusing on not only the difference between democracy and dictatorship, but also
the difference among democratic systems, such as parliamentary or presidential regimes,
and divided or coalition governments.
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The remaining of this essay consists as follows.
Chapter two analyzes the political economy of delayed agreements over fiscal reforms,
in a setting where two interest groups can bargain over the allocation of the cost of the
stabilization. This contrasts with the classic contribution of Alesina and Drazen (1991),
which assumes that a group which concedes earlier bears a fixed disproportionate share
of the burden. The approach of this chapter is to study an alternating offers model of
bargaining in the economic environment of Alesina and Drazen, i.e., where bargaining takes
place in continuous time, and there is two-sided uncertainty. This allows a systematic
comparison of expected delay in the bargaining game (i.e. “the coalition government”)
and in the concession game (i.e. “the divided government”). When interest groups are
sufficiently patient, or when shares in the concession game are highly unequal, agreement
is reached more quickly on average under bargaining. But, both games have the common
feature that delay signals the “toughness” of interest groups.
Chapter three compares default incentives in competitive sovereign debt markets when
leaders can be either democratically elected or dictators. This provides a novel solution
to the paradox pointed out by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), that if savings are allowed, then
countries will prefer to default on their debt at some point. A noticeable innovation is to
introduce incomplete information on the ability type of leaders. The result show that this
gives leaders incentives not to default on foreign debt even when it is to the advantage
of the representative agent to do so. When leaders can be replaced, as in democracies,
the incentives for repayment are mainly the ego rents from office. In a dictatorship, on
the other hand, the cost of not repaying loans is the permanent loss of reputation and the
loss of future access to credit. Under the optimal contract, there is a trade off between
repayment and risk sharing. I show, that when ego rents are high and value of reputation
to dictators is low, then democracies have incentive to repay more in good states, and then
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repay less in bad states under the optimal contract. Thus under these circumstances, the
democratic leader defaults more often than dictatorships, improving risk-sharing.
Chapter four examines the political economy of sovereign debt crises, using a newly
constructed database that maps the timing of sovereign debt rescheduling decisions in 81
countries for 1975-2010. While comparatively little empirical work has been undertaken,
in comparison with existing empirical literature, this chapter studies the role of politi-
cal institutions more comprehensively – I analyze both democratic and non-democratic
regimes, and investigate a large number of political instituional characteristics, while con-
trolling macro-economic variables that account for debt dynamics. A notable innovation is
to study the Paris Club (sovereign creditors) and the London Club (private creditors) debt
reschedules separately. To my best knowledge, the literature has ignored the difference
along with the data limitation.
The empirical results validate and support the view that political factors matter for
debt sustainability. I find empirical supports, under some conditions, for the hypothesis
that parliamentary democracies have a lower propensity to reschedule their external liabil-
ities than presidency scheme. This result is consistent with the theoretical literatures that
the parliamentary regime has a strong check-and-balance system on executives. It then
finds that the probability of default is lower in countries under government concentration.
This finding may be seen as being in line with a theoretical implication by Alesina and
Drazen (1991) that fiscal adjustments tend to be delayed under a divided government. I
also find that the probability of rescheduling seems to be increased by political instability,
such as electoral competitiveness. If the competitiveness increases, the chance to be re-
elected in the next election is lower, which may lead to disincentives to save. Interestingly,
in contrast, the occurrence of default seems to be lower when the executive is expected to
remain in office for the next term. Finally, the result shows that the Paris Club members
7
tend to give more support to those borrowers who are democratic than to those who are
not, while this has not been observed in the London Club. This may correspond to “demo-
cratic advantage” given by international community. Importantly, these results are robust
to extensive controls and to numerous changes of specifications and estimation method.
Beyond providing a contribution to the existing literatures, these findings have important
implications for both academics and policy-makers who analyze sovereign defaults.
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Chapter 2
Delay in Fiscal Reform
2.1 Introduction
The sustainability problem of government deficits is currently in the spotlight all over the
world. It is vital for developing countries seeking to avoid bankruptcy to develop adequate
debt management policies, especially in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the 2010 Eurozone crisis. This need for fiscal sustainability is also shared by industrialized
countries, even the United States. Spending for social programs continues to rise, reflecting
the rapidly aging population. In order to keep the fiscal condition sustainable, in general,
cutting spending, increasing taxes, or both would be required. On the other hand, countries
sometimes pursue economic policies that are widely recognized as unsustainable and costly
to all groups. Why such a fiscal reform is delayed? How can we promote the reform?
The current theoretical explanations for the delay are summarized as follows. First,
free-rider problem allows every group to have incentives to avoid sharing the burden as
0As declared, this chapter has been published as a working paper as PRI Discussion Paper Series 08A-06,
at the Policy Research Institute, Japanese Ministry of Finance.
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in Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Velasco (2000). Even when it was widely recognized
that fiscal adjustment were necessary, a social consensus on the sharing of the burden of
stabilization programme was difficult to achieve. Secondly, lobbying activities of interest
groups may affect the date of stabilization as in Tornell (1998). Expenditure cuts might
involve the so called “pork-barrel” problem, and thus also bring on political difficulties.
Thirdly, every group is likely to expect that things would get better before such measures
being implemented. More practically, politicians tend to avoid tax increase, because this
policy change can burden citizens directly. Therefore, given the expectation, the reform is
likely to be politically shirked by national rebellion.
Among them, one of the most influential explanations has been taken by Alesina and
Drazen (1991). They applied “war-of-attrition” to explain why the reforms are delayed,
where they elaborated on earlier ideas by Riley (1980) and Bliss and Nalebuff (1984).1
In their model, even if overall benefits are obviously expected to exceed the overall
cost of the reform, the reform can be delayed as long as the burden of stabilization is
unequally distributed. Stabilization occurs only when one group concedes and bears a
disproportionate share of the burden, which is exogenously fixed. The groups have to
concede at some point because there is the cost of waiting, which is private information.
Thus, as long as participants in the process believe that someone else may have a higher cost
of waiting, concede earlier and then accept a larger share of the burden, every group has an
incentive to attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups by waiting for
the action of others, as in the free-riding behaviour in provision of public goods. As a result,
stabilization does not occur immediately. If every group takes the cooperative strategy,
they could obtain the benefit, but this solution can not be obtained on equilibrium path.
1Riley (1980) built the biological war-of-attrition model, and Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) focused on the
public good model.
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This is called “a war of attrition” among interest groups. They solve for the expected time
of stabilization in a model of “rational” delay and analyze it relating to several political
and economic variables.
This influential paper Alesina and Drazen (1991) has been extended in several direc-
tions. In Drazen and Grilli (1993)’s non-monetary model without an explicit inflation rate,
monetization is introduced as a distortionary tax before stabilization. Casella and Eichen-
green (1996) analyzes the conditions under which a foreign aid can accelerate stabilization.
The aid are used to reduce the fiscal burden of the group that concedes first. Spolaore
(2004) examines the relative performance of three different government systems in terms
of the efficiency of stabilization. Martinelli and Escorza (2007) modified the assumption in
Alesina and Drazen (1991) that each group chooses the same expected concession time due
to ex-ante symmetry which leads to a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Further discussions
will be described in the following section.
While these models successfully figure out the mechanism of delayed reforms, most
of literatures with the concession framework assume that each group may take a non
cooperative behaviour. This concession process can be regarded as a dead locked situation
in the divided government with endless debates where interests group have no ways to
compromise. But it can be also considered that in the process of reaching an agreement on
stabilization, each group in a coalition government may negotiate or bargain on the share
of the cost of stabilization.2 Hence it is natural to assume that the groups would negotiate
over the combination of policies and that all groups could agree with an allocation of the
cost as a consequence of the bargaining.3
2See Persson and Tabellini (2000) chapter 7.2 which describes the legislative bargaining.
3In order to see this point practically, consider the case where the interest groups could be the repre-
sentatives of firms and workers; a group for firms is likely to insist to raise the value added tax or build
11
Stabilization policies then can be made through the bargaining in the legislative pro-
cess. Bargaining over the share can be a device to adopt the information dynamics into
the concession process. In other words, with the legislative bargaining process for incom-
pletely informed groups or parties, the expected delay of reform can be different from in
the war-of-attrition setting. Needless to say, both process should be compared in order to
make a reform with less delay. Hence the aim of this chapter is to describe the model of de-
layed stabilization in both bargaining and concession framework under the same economic
environment in order to compare the expected delay of both processes. This comparison
may lead to some policy implications.
Very few papers deal with bargaining of delayed reform. Hsieh (2000) and Sibert and
Perraudin (2000) extend Alesina and Drazen (1991)’s war of attrition model by endoge-
nizing the distribution of the stabilization costs through a bargaining process. But due to
their strong assumption, they have limitation to compare with the result of Alesina and
Drazen (1991). Both of them suppose one-sided uncertainty. Their models also assume
one-sided offering.4 As Alesina and Drazen (1991) considered conflicts among two or more
interest groups in infinite time, alternating offer would be rather reasonable assumption.
Furthermore, both of them could not indicate the length of delay, as they assume a finite
horizon model with discrete time, two or three stages.
Unlike them, in this chapter we will build the two-sided incomplete information and
alternating offer model under an infinite horizon with continuous time, regarding Cramton
the proportional tax, while the group for workers tends to propose an increase in the capital tax or more
strengthened progressive tax. The final solution would be a mixed policy of these taxes. They might also
fight upon the burden of welfare benefits. For concrete example, as in Alesina and Drazen (1991), the
components of successful Poincare´ stabilization in 1926 were considered as a revised version of his initial
proposal of 1924, which had been denied by the other party.
4Hsieh (2000) applies conflicts among capitalists and labours over wages.
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(1992) for describing and characterizing sequential equilibrium. Then we could obtain
the expected delay in the bargaining process which will be directly compared with the
concession process.
Again while this chapter is related to Alesina and Drazen (1991) in the analysis of
the delay of macro stabilizations, the contribution of this essay is to set up and solve
the bargaining game in the legislative process in addition to the war-of-attrition game
in Alesina and Drazen (1991); in this chapter, the interest groups can communicate and
exchange private information through generalized bargaining system.5
Main findings are the following. The introduction of information aggregation process
makes the difference in the expected delay between concession and bargaining setup. Thus
this chapter analyzes how the both of concession and bargaining process affect the expected
delay of stabilization. With two-sided uncertainty and alternating offering, interest groups
use a delay as a strategic variable. The simulation with the uniform distribution shows that
when interest groups are more patient than a threshold, the bargaining process may hasten
the stabilization. Meanwhile, when groups are more impatient, the bargaining may rather
take more time to reach an agreement on the reform due to the negotiation procedure.
Furthermore, in more polarized economy, the bargaining process may lead to the shorter
delay more effectively. As a consequence, comparison of two process may imply which
process would be more efficient in terms of the expected delay of fiscal reform.
This allows a systematic comparison of expected delay in the bargaining game and in
the concession game of Alesina and Drazen. When interest groups are sufficiently patient,
or when shares in the concession game are very unequal, agreement is reached more quickly
5A large part of the political economy literature are silent on how the relevant agents acquire and
aggregate information.
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on average under bargaining. But, both games have the common feature that delay signals
the “toughness” of the interest group.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Related literatures are reviewed in
Section 2. The set up of the model is described in Section 3. The equilibrium in the
bargaining process are presented in Section 4. The War of Attrition game is discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 analyze the welfare in the economy. Section 7 compares two results
and obtains policy implication. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
First of all, we will briefly look at Alesina and Drazen (1991). They applied “war-of-
attrition” to explain why the reforms are delayed. They solve for the expected time of
stabilization in a model of “rational” delay and analyze it relating to several political and
economic variables. As long as participants in the process believe that someone else may
have a higher cost of waiting, stabilization does not occur immediately. If all groups are
identical like a single agent, then one stabilizes immediately as one knows that he will be
the stabilizer with probability one. An increase in the cost of waiting will move the ex-
pected date of a stabilization forward. If the gain from waiting is larger, each group holds
out longer. The difference in the shares of the burden of stabilization could be interpreted
as representing the degree of political cohesion in the society. If the difference is larger,
the economy is more polarized or less cohesive. As the relative burden of stabilization is
unequally distributed, it might be harder to reach agreements on how to allocate tax in-
creases among coalition partners. If the burden of stabilization is shared relatively equally,
stabilization occurs more immediately.
In Drazen and Grilli (1993)’s non-monetary model without an explicit inflation rate,
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monetization is introduced as a distortionary tax before stabilization. They show that
highly distortionary finance can be welfare improving. Higher inflation will shorten the
delay by raising the cost of living in the economy before a stabilization. There is a trade-
off with higher inflation of lowering welfare until a stabilization and inducing an earlier
time of agreement on use of nondisortinary financing. This paper also shows by simulation
methods that the U-shape relationship between the expected utility and inflation rate, and
between the expected concession time and the inflation rate.
During a war of attrition, a change in the environment may lead to a change in the date
of concession. For example, Casella and Eichengreen (1996) analyzes the conditions under
which foreign aid can accelerate stabilization, where the aid reduces the fiscal burden of
the group that concedes first. Incoming aid will reduce future fiscal burden and therefore
this should hasten stabilization. But at the same time, there is an incentive for players to
postpone concession until arriving closer to the moment of transfer. Due to distributional
conflicts to shift the cost onto its rival, the aid announced relatively early in the inflation
process can accelerate stabilization. On the other hand, the aid announced or delivered
after a considerable delay can have the opposite effect. Thus the effects of aid are contingent
and timing of release of information is crucial.
Spolaore (2004) analyzes the relative performance of three different government systems
in terms of inefficient delays of stabilization to occur; cabinet system, in which one decision
maker has full control over adjustment policies; consensus system, in which adjustment
policies must be agreed upon by all agents; and checks-and-balances system, in which one
agent decides what policy adjustment should be used, but the remaining agents may veto
its use. The result is that checks-and-balance system dominates pure consensus systems,
but may or may not outperform cabinet systems. The outcome depends on the degree of
political fragmentation and the size of distributions of shocks.
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In symmetric Nash equilibrium as in Alesina and Drazen (1991), each group chooses
the same expected concession time. Martinelli and Escorza (2007) modified this strong
assumption of ex ante symmetry. As the gains from stabilization of each group are drawn
from the different distribution, an interest group, which is more exposed to inflation costs,
will be likely to give in immediately, leading to earlier stabilization. They show by sim-
ulation that, if the expected cost of inflation increases for the more exposed group, then
the probability of immediate reform increases. The effect of a reduction in the cost of
inflation, benefiting mostly the less exposed group, may be a shorter delay. Intuition is
that the more exposed group will prefer to give up at time zero by realizing the cost.
The paper also shows by simulation that, if the distributive outcome of reform become
more unequal, the probability of immediate agreement increases as the more exposed group
which realize the high cost, prefers to give up at time zero. But at the same time, the
expected delay of stabilization increases, since an increase in the distributional outcome
raises the willingness to fight against the opponent.
Furthermore, a policymaker may have an incentive to abandon fiscal responsibility and
revert to inflation method, as this way is costless rather than other taxation with legislative
process. If the public is uncertain about the degree of commitment of the policymaker to
fiscal responsibility, success is less likely.
2.3 The Model
In this chapter, we analyze a stripped-down version of Alesina and Drazen (1991) in order
to analyze the difference between bargaining results and concession results. Time is con-
tinuous and infinite t ∈ (0,∞). At t = 0, the government deficit is zero and the economy is
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hit by a shock reducing tax revenue by amount τ . From then until the date of stabilization
T , the government deficit τ has to be financed at each period by distortionary taxation.6
There are two political groups or parties i = L,R.7 Before stabilization, each party
pays one half of the distortionary taxation and, in addition, suffers from some welfare
loss θiτ , where θi is private information to each party i. The parameters θ measures the
deadweight loss of tax burden τ2 suffered by group i = L,R. Thus the total loss due to
taxation suffered by group i at any time before stabilization is described as (12 + θi)τ .
The type of group i, θi , is independently drawn at t = 0 from a common continuous
distribution F (θ) with θ ∈ [θ, θ¯].8 This θi is private information, which is known only to
the group itself, while the other only knows the distribution F (θ) and its positive density
function f(θ).
The distortions disappear with stabilization at t = T . In other words, all groups benefit
from stabilization because of the existence of distortionary taxes before stabilization. But
the two groups can negotiate, or bargain, over the sharing of the burden of stabilization.
Let κi be the share borne by group i ; κL + κR = 1. This means that after stabilization at
T , group i must make a tax payment to the government of κiτ in perpetuity.
We are now ready to write down the utility flows to group i, given a stabilization occurs
at T , with shares κL and κR. For group i, utility at instant t is equal consumption, which
6In Alesina and Drazen (1991), deficit is covered by distortionary taxation and governmental bond. But
this assumption is not very essential. For example, Martinelli and Escorza (2007) put an assumption of no
bond issue, and Drazen and Grilli (1993) considered the monetary version of this model where the deficit
is financed by inflation tax without issued bond.
7This may be generalized easily to more than two groups in a case where we set the assumption of
exogenous fixed shares of cost of stabilization. On the other hand, in the bargaining model, multiple
players case might become very complicated.
8In concession setup, we need to set the lower bound of θ > 0 to avoid no concession cases.
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in turn is equal to exogenous income (normalized to zero), minus tax payments and the
deadweight loss before T ,
ui(t) =
 (−1/2− θi)τ if t ≤ T−κiτ if t > T. (2.1)
We also assume that groups are infinitely lived and discount the future according to
a common rate r, which is known to both groups. Hence total discounted payoff with
stabilization at t = T can be written as
V (T, κi; θi) =
∫ ∞
0
ui(t)e
−rt dt
= −
∫ T
0
(τ
2
+ θiτ
)
e−rt dt−
∫ ∞
T
κiτe
−rt dt
=
τ
r
[
e−rT
(
θi +
1
2
− κi
)
+
(
−1
2
− θi
)]
. (2.2)
In what follows, note that the only part of V that depends on T and κi is e
−rT (θi + 12 − κi),
so we can think of each group as maximizing just
U i(T, κi; θi) = e
−rT
(
θi +
1
2
− κi
)
. (2.3)
In the bargaining game, to be described below, the players bargain over κL and κR
by making alternating offers. However, it is convenient and without loss of generality to
transform the problem by assuming that they bargain over the object α = 12 − κR, which
must lie between −12 and 12 . A positive α means κR < 12 , ie group R has to pay relatively
smaller share of the burden, and conversely a negative α means that group L has to pay
relatively smaller share of the burden.9 Then, expected payoffs over agreement on (α, T )
can be written as
UL = e−rT (θL − α) and UR = e−rT (θR + α) . (2.4)
9Needless to say, if the cost is equally distributed at κR = κL = 1/2, α = 0.
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In the concession framework, which will be solved in Section 5, the share of cost of
stabilization is exogenously determined. A group which concedes earlier than the other
has to bear a higher share κ > 12 , while the rest of this, 1 − κ, is borne by the other
group. Each party maximizes its expected lifetime payoff by choosing a time to concede
if the other party has not yet conceded. They, therefore, have an incentive to wait till
the other takes the initiative of the reform. Note that, in the concession game, we assume
θi +
1
2 − κi > 0 to avoid no concession, meaning that stabilization occurs in finite time
with probability one. If this does not hold, groups will always postpone their decisions to
concede or offer.
2.4 Equilibrium Delay in the Bargaining Game
In this section, we analyze the war-of-attrition with the bargaining process by allowing each
group to bargain over the share of cost of stabilization, while this parameter in Alesina
and Drazen (1991) is exogenous. We adopt Cramton (1992)’s model for this purpose.
2.4.1 Description of the Game
At t = 0, each group gets to know their own private information θi of how much exposed to
distortionary taxes. Then they start to negotiate over α. In this section, as θi can be used
to express a value revealed by offering in the bargaining process, true valuations are often
denoted by L and R respectively, in order to explicitly distinguish the true value with the
revealed value.
If at time t neither group L nor R has yet made an offer of α, either group L or R
can make an offer at t. If, for example, group L has made an offer at t, group R either
(a) accepts, in which the game ends, with payoffs given by equation (2.2), or (b) after a
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minimum period t0, makes a counter offer. The minimum period is set at t
0 = −(1/r) log δ
as in Admati and Perry (1987). δ is the discount factor from one period delay.10 As they
make an offer alternately, they can choose the delay between offers as a signal.
As time passes, the gain from stabilization is discounted by r. Thus both groups prefer
agreement on today to the same agreement tomorrow. We now show that delay is more
costly for a high θ than for a low θ. More precisely, a high θ type is willing to give a bigger
concession in term of α to get a given reduction in the stabilization time. In other words,
the utility function satisfies the single crossing property, with which utility of interest each
group is strictly monotone in α and the slope of indifference curve is strictly monotone in
θ. Then the indifference curves of θ and θ
′
cross only once. Figure 2.1 shows this property
for the interest group L and Figure 2.2 for the group R respectively.
T

UL(,T; L)
UL(,T; ’L)
Figure 2.1: θ
′
L > θL
T

UR(,T; R)
UR(,T; ’R)
Figure 2.2: θ
′
R > θR
Lemma 1 The payoffs of each group satisfy the single crossing property.
Proof. For R, the expected payoff over the bargaining process is UR(α, T ; θR) = e
−rT (θR+
10Later on, we analyze the limiting case such that the minimum time between offers goes to zero (δ → 1),
in order to compare with the concession set up.
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α). Hence ∂UR/∂α = e−rT > 0 and ∂UR/∂T = −re−rT (θR + α) < 0. Thus the slope of
the indifference curve is −(∂UR/∂T )/(∂UR/∂α) = r(θR + α), which is strictly increasing
in θR. For L, we identically obtain −(∂UL/∂T )/(∂UL/∂α) = −r(θL−α), which is strictly
decreasing in θL. The proof for the single crossing property of the original function in
Alesina and Drazen (1991) is given in Lemma 3.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Strategies
We will build a sequential equilibrium where both groups use a delay as a strategic variable
and interact by offering and accepting. Before analyzing the equilibrium path, we define
the equilibrium offer, the acceptance or delay decision as a function of beliefs.
Equilibrium Offer under No Uncertainty After both type are revealed by offering,
equilibrium offer after this becomes the Rubinstein (1982) full information offer and the
most patient type accept the offer.
In full information about both type, the alternating offer game with a fixed time be-
tween offers has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the groups stabilize immedi-
ately at the share α(L,R) if L makes the initial offer and α(R,L) if R makes the initial
offer.11
At Rubinstein offers, each group is indifferent between accepting at the other’s offer
immediately or stabilizing at his own offer after a one period delay such as
R+ α(L,R) = δ(R+ α(R,L)) and L− α(R,L) = δ(L− α(L,R)).
Hence equilibrium shares are gives as
α(L,R) =
δL−R
1 + δ
and α(R,L) =
L− δR
1 + δ
. (2.5)
11See Rubinstein (1982).
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Thus offering group receives a truncated payoff of δ(R+L)/(1 + δ) and the other receives
δ2(R + L)/(1 + δ). After revealing value θR and θL, along the equilibrium path, L makes
offer α(θL, θR), and R accepts this offer, since rejecting and making counter offer α(θR, θL)
tomorrow yields the same payoff as accepting α(θL, θR) today.
Acceptance/Delay Decision under One-sided Uncertainty Suppose that L reveals
θL, but R’s value is still private information. In this case, a less patient R accepts the offer,
while a more patient R rejects the offer.
Define θ˜R(θL, α) as the type of R that is indifferent between accepting or rejecting
the offer α with revealing θL. Hence θ˜R(θL, α) is indifferent between α(θL, θ˜R) today and
α(θ˜R, θL) tomorrow.
θ˜R + α(θL, θ˜R) = δ(θ˜R + α(θ˜R, θL)) = δ(θ˜R +
θL − δθ˜R
1 + δ
) =
δ
1 + δ
(θ˜R + θL)
Solving θ˜R and the analogous θ˜L, we obtain
θ˜R = −(1 + δ)α(θL) + δθL and θ˜L = (1 + δ)α(θR) + δθR. (2.6)
A group R ≥ θ˜R(θL, α) accepts the offer α(θL, θ˜R), while a group R < θ˜R(θL, α) prefers
to delay before making the revealing offer α(θR, θL). L infers that R = θR(∆ |θL, θ˜R) if R
delays ∆ before making the offer α(θR, θL) and that R ≥ θ˜R would have accepted L’s offer.
The optimal length of delay Γ(R |θL, θ˜R) before offering α(R, θL) is given by the incentive
constraint
e−rΓ [R+ α(θR(Γ), θL)] = max
∆
e−r∆[R+ α(θR(∆), θL)].
First order condition with regards to ∆ can be derived as
∂UR
∂∆
= −re−r∆[R+ α(θR, θL)] + e−r∆ ∂α
∂θR
∂θR
∂∆
= 0
22
⇔ −r
(
R+
L− δR
1 + δ
)
+
−δ
1 + δ
∂θR
∂∆
= 0.
Then this yields the separable first order differential equation
∂θR
∂∆
= −r
δ
(θR + θL).
The optimal delay is then obtained by integration of ∂∆ as
Γ(R |θL, θ˜R) =
∫ R
θ˜R
−δ
r
dθR
θR + θL
= −δ
r
∫ R
θ˜R
(θR + θL)
−1dθR
= −δ
r
[
log(θR + θL)
]R
θ˜R
= −δ
r
log
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
. (2.7)
The inverse θR(∆ |θL, θ˜R) is given as
−r∆
δ
= log
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
⇔ θR(∆ |θL, θ˜R) = (θ˜R + θL)e− r∆δ − θL. (2.8)
By the single-crossing property, since Γ and θR are strictly decreasing, this is necessary
and sufficient for the optimization problem. The analogous functions for group L are
derived as
Γ(L |θR, θ˜L) = −δ
r
log
θR + L
θR + θ˜L
(2.9)
θL(∆ |θR, θ˜L) = (θR + θ˜L)e− r∆δ − θR. (2.10)
2.4.3 Equilibrium Path
Initially, both groups delay negotiations by refusing to make an initial offer. As time goes
on, both groups become anxious about the gains from stabilization, since if the gains are
larger, the other group would have made an offer. Define θR(∆) as a value of R that makes
an initial offer after ∆, and Γ(R) = θ−1R (R) as the delay until R makes an initial offer if
L does not make one until then. θL(∆) and Γ(L) = θ
−1
L (L) are analogous. Less patient
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group which can obtain higher gains from stabilization is likely to stabilize earlier. Hence
θR(∆), θL(∆), Γ(L) and Γ(R) are decreasing functions.
After a delay of ∆ without an offer, R believes that the value of L is no less than θL(∆),
that is, L is in [0, θL(∆)], as a less patient group L > θL(∆) would have made an offer
before ∆. L’s belief on R’s valuation conditional on the history is the truncated prior:
FL(R |∆) = F (R)
F (θR(∆))
for 0 ≤ R ≤ θR(∆).
Similarly, after a delay of ∆, L believes that the value of R is in [0, θR(∆)].
Then there are three possible cases in the equilibrium path, depending on the valuations
L and R:
1. L is less patient than R. L makes the initial offer α(θL, θ˜R) after a delay of Γ(L),
where θ˜R is the most patient R to accept the offer. If R ≥ θ˜R, R accepts the offer
without delay. Otherwise, R rejects the offer and reveals his type R by delaying Γ(R)
plus the minimum delay t0 before making the counter offer α(R,L). L accepts the
offer without delay.
2. R is less patient than L. R makes the initial offer α(θR, θ˜L) after a delay of Γ(R),
where θ˜L is the most patient L to accept the offer. If L ≥ θ˜L, L accepts the offer
without delay. Otherwise, L rejects the offer and reveals his type L by delaying Γ(L)
plus the minimum delay t0 before making the counter offer α(L,R). R accepts the
offer without delay.
3. R is equal to L. If the groups happen to make initial offers at the same timing, a
coin is flopped to determine which group will be the initial one. Then one’s offer is
accepted without delay.
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Negotiations end in finite time after at most two offers, but the equilibrium path still
depends on the group’s option to make alternating offers. The strategies depend only on
the current beliefs and the recent offer. The posterior beliefs following an offer depend
only on the prior belief and the amount of delay before the offer.
2.4.4 Equilibrium Delay
We will state the strategies and beliefs in the three phases of the game; Phase 0, in which
no offers have been made; Phase 1, in which one offer has been made; and Phase 2, in
which two or more offers have been made. Suppose L makes an initial offer and then R
responds with acceptance or a counteroffer. The other possible path, in which R makes
the first offer, are symmetric. Then we solve equilibrium in backward way such as dynamic
programming.
For simplicity, we assume that the group never make offers which are more attractive
than their revealed value.
Phase 2 Suppose that the previous offers reveal valuations θR and θL, and that R just
made an offer α(θR). Let’s θ
0
L = min{θL, θ˜L(θR, α)}.
If L counter offers after delay of ∆ in response to R’s offer α(θR, θL), then R infers that
L’s valuation is θL(∆ |θR, θ0L). L’s response to R’s offer α(θR, θL) could be:
(i) if L ≥ θ0L, accept α without delay, given L − α(θR, θL) ≥ δ[L − α(θ0L, θR)], otherwise,
counter α(θ0L, θR) without delay. Then R accepts the offer with probability one.
(ii) if L < θ0L, counter α(L, θR) after delay Γ(L | θR, θ0L). Then R accepts the offer with
probability one.
Proposition 1 In the subgame after both group have revealed their private information θR
and θL, the belief and strategies form an equilibrium. In the equilibrium path, stabilization
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Phase 2Phase 1Phase 0
R offers
α(θR,θL)
t=0
R rejects
R accepts
without delay
L accepts
without delay
R<θR
RθRL offers
α(θL,θR)
(R| θL,θR)
(L)
Figure 2.3: Timing of the Game
occurs without delay at a share of cost α(θL, θR) if L make an offer or α(θR, θL) if R make
an offer.
Proof. See Appendix.
As Cramton (1992) argued, this equilibrium path satisfies the “spirit” of the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion, since beliefs are revised following the signal of strength.12 Thus beliefs
may change by the actions that groups take. In other words, delay provides a group with
12Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion provide a refinement of sequential equilibrium, while not every sequential
equilibrium satisfies this criterion. In a signaling game with a sequential equilibrium, an action that will
not reach in equilibrium is said to violate the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion if: there exists some out-of-
equilibrium action so that one type can gain by deviating to this action, when the receiver interprets her
type correctly, while every other type cannot gain by deviating to this action even if the receiver interprets
her truly.
Hence, the separating equilibrium satisfying Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion is more ’robust’ than other
sequential equilibrium or Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. See more details in Cho and Kreps (1987).
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a mean to convince the other of the truth.
On the other hand, if groups have a threat with beliefs, the Rubinstein solution can not
be sustained, while beliefs in Rubinstein model are fixed due to the common knowledge
of valuation. Wheres fixing beliefs violates the Cho-Kreps criterion. Then, in order to
guarantee the Rubinstein outcome in this subgame, we assume beliefs stay fixed at the
revealed value, unless an offer is delayed or an offer that should have been accepted is
mistakenly rejected. This discussion is for off equilibrium path, where mistakes can be
taken.
Phase 1 Suppose that L revealed θL with an offer α(θL), and that R just made an offer
α. Let’s θ0R = min{θR, θ˜R(θL, α)}.
If R counter offers after delay of ∆ in response to L’s offer, then L infers that R’s
valuation is θR(∆ |θL, θ0R) with probability one. R’s response to L’s offer α is:
(i) if R ≥ θ0R, accept α without delay, given R + α(θL) ≥ δ[R + α(θ0R, θL)], otherwise,
counter α(θ0R, θL) without delay. Then R accepts the offer with probability one.
(ii) if R < θ0R, counter α(R, θL) after delay Γ(R |θL, θ0R). Then follow phase 2.
Proposition 2 In the subgame after L has revealed θL with an offer α(θL), the beliefs and
strategies form an equilibrium. In the equilibrium path, R accepts α(θL) without delay if
R ≥ θ˜R(θL, α), and otherwise counter the offer α(R, θL) after a delay Γ(R). This offer is
accepted without delay by L.
Proof. See Appendix.
Phase 0 Suppose that no offers have been made. In this initial subgame, if R does not
make any offer before a delay ∆, L infers that R’s valuation is [0, θR(∆)]. If R makes the
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initial offer α after ∆, L infers that R’s valuation is θR(∆) with probability one. Then
follows phase 1. If R does not make an offer, L makes an initial offer α(L, θ˜R(L)) after
Γ(L). Then follow Phase 1.
The groups determine when they make an offer as a function of their valuations. As
the timing of offer is a monotone function of one’s valuation, a separate equilibrium may
exist. The followings are focused on L, but the analysis for R is analogous. First, we
determine L’s optimal offer at time ∆, provided that R infers that the valuation of L is θL
with probability one.
Proposition 3 If L makes an initial offer after a delay of ∆ and L believes that R ∈
[0, θR(∆)], then in the equilibrium path, L makes an initial offer of α(θL, θ˜R) where θ˜R
uniquely satisfies
F (θR)− F (θ˜R)− (1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL) = δ3
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)1+δ
dF (R). (2.11)
Proof. See Appendix.
Then we determine the initial time of delay Γ(L) and valuation θL(∆). Due to the
incentive constraint, a less patient group would imitate a more patient group by delaying
longer ∆ > Γ(L), in order to convince the other that her valuation is more patient, that
is, L < θL(∆). Hence, to make θL(∆) be a part of an equilibrium, the guarantee that such
a deviation is not incentive compatible should be imposed. The best response to a delay
∆ should be a offer after Γ(L).
Proposition 4 If the time between offers is sufficiently small, then the strategies and
beliefs form an equilibrium. The initial delay for L is
Γ(L) =
∫ L
0
q(θL) + k(θL)− δc(θL)
r(θ˜R + θL)c(θL)
dθL
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where c(θL) = F (θL)−F (θ˜R)− (1− δ)(θ˜R+θL)f(θ˜R), q(θL) = δ2(δ−1)
∫ (
R+θL
θ˜R+θL
)δ
dF (R)
and k(θL) =
δ
1+δ f(θL) (2θ˜R − 2δθL). θ˜R(θL) uniquely satisfies (2.8).
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to derive explicit solutions to compare with war-of-attrition case, consider the
case where the valuation of both groups are on uniform distribution.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the valuation of both groups are uniformly distributed. Then
L delays Γ(L) before making an initial offer. θL(∆) makes an initial offer α(θL(∆)) after
∆. Then R ≥ θ˜R(∆) immediately accepts the offer, where
Γ(L) =
δ(4γ − 2δ − γδ − 2)
2r(1 + δ)γ(γδ − 2γ + 1) logL and γ =
2 + δ
4 + 2δ − 2δ2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
By using the result of Proposition 5, the equilibrium strategies in this case can be
derived as
θL(∆) = e
2r(1+δ)γ(γδ−2γ+1)
δ(4γ−2δ−γδ−2) ∆ and θ˜R(∆) = (2γ − 1)θL(∆).
Thus, the minimum expected delay in the bargaining is Γ(L), when L makes an initial
offer and it is accepted immediately. On the other hand, on equilibrium path, there may
be a sequential equilibrium, where whether the initial offer is accepted or rejected depends
on the valuation of the other. If the initial offer is rejected, R makes a counter offer after
Γ(R | θL, θ˜R) and it is accepted by L. In this case, the expected delay of stabilization is
Γ(L) + Γ(R). Hence the expected delay of stabilization can be described as
EDB =
Γ(L) if L ≥ R ≥ θ˜RΓ(L) + Γ(R | θL, θ˜R). if 0 < R < θ˜R
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In the bargaining framework, a group becomes more impatient if their expected gain
from stabilization is larger. Then the group with larger expectations of gains makes initial
offer, hence makes concession earlier on. Initial offer is only accepted if the gain are
sufficiently large. Thus the larger are gains, stabilization may occur sooner. Also the
larger is discount rate, the time of delay is more shortened.
2.5 Equilibrium Delay in the War-of-Attrition Game
In order to compare the results in both concession and bargaining setups, in this section,
we discuss the equilibrium delay in the war-of-attrition case, where the share of cost of
stabilization is exogenously determined as in Alesina and Drazen (1991) and most of exten-
sions. In the concession framework, the problem of each party is to maximize its expected
lifetime payoff by choosing a time to concede if the other party has not yet conceded.
Due to concession, one of the two groups (the loser) has to agree to bear a higher
fraction of the new non-distortionary taxes, while the rest of this is borne by the other
group (the winner). The share imposed on a group which concedes earlier is κLi = κ > 1/2,
which is exogenous parameter. Note that in Alesina and Drazen (1991), κ is treated as the
measures of the divergence between the distributional implications of the reform plan, or
‘degree of polarization’ of society.
If a group concedes earlier, then one receives the flow payoff uLi = −κτ and the other
receives uWi = −(1 − κ)τ . Thus the expected payoff as of time t = 0 as a function of
one’s chosen concession time Ti is the sum of V
i(θi, T, κ
L
i ) multiplied by the probability of
the other not having conceded by Ti and V
i(θi, T, κ
W
i ) multiplied by the probability of the
other group conceding at t for all t ≤ Ti. Define H(T ) as the distribution of the opponent’s
optimal concession time and h(T ) as the associated density function. Then the expected
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payoff as a function of Ti can be written as
EV i(Ti) = [1−H(Ti)]
[∫ Ti
0
ui(t)e
−rtdt +
∫ ∞
Ti
uLi (t)e
−rtdt
]
+
∫ t=Ti
t=0
[∫ t
0
ui(x)e
−rxdx+
∫ ∞
t
uWi (x)e
−rxdx
]
h(t)dt.
Lemma 2 The concession time is monotonically decreasing in θi such as T
′
i (θi) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This shows that the higher is the cost to distortion, the earlier group concedes. In
order to find the optimal concession time T (θ) for a group of type θ, we will consider a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.13 In this equilibrium, if each group’s concession behaviour
is described by the same function T (θ), it is optimal for a group to behave according to
T (θ). Given concession time as a function of θ, the expected delay of stabilization in the
concession EDC is then the expected min{T (θL), T (θR)} with the expectation taken over
F (θ).
Proposition 6 The expected concession time in a symmetric Nash equilibrium is chosen
to maximize the expected payoff as[
− f(θ)
F (θ)
1
T ′(θ)
]
2κ− 1
r
= θ +
1
2
− κ
and the boundary condition T (θ) = 0 holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
The right hand side is the cost of waiting another instant to concede, that is, the differ-
ence between the loss due to distortion and the increase in tax burden by the stabilization
to the group who concedes. The left hand side is the expected gain from waiting another
13This derivation mainly follows Alesina and Drazen (1991).
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instant to concede, which is the product of the conditional probability that another con-
cedes multiplied by the gain if the other concedes. A concession occurs when the cost of
waiting is equal to the expected gain from waiting.
If the group is characterized by the maximum possible cost of distortion, it will con-
cede immediately and there will be no war-of-attrition. As long as all groups in the process
initially believe that someone else may have a higher θ, stabilization does not occur imme-
diately.
Then, we will consider the case where F (θ) is uniform over [θ, θ¯].14 In this case, as
F (θ) = (θ − θ)/(θ¯ − θ), then −f(θ)/F (θ) = 1/(θ − θ). Under this assumption, T ′(θ) is
therefore given by
T ′(θ) = − f(θ)
F (θ)
2κ− 1
r
1
θ + 1/2− κ
=
(2κ− 1)/r
(θ − θ)(θ + 1/2− κ) .
Using the method of partial fractions and integrating, the optimal time of concession of a
14As in Section 2.2, we assume F (θ) ∈ [0.1]. On the other hand, we also assume θi + 1/2 − κi > 0 to
assure the concession to occur. Hence in the concession setup, the lower bound θ exists to satisfy this
assumption. Below this threshold, no concession occurs, that is, the expected delay goes to infinity. Note
that θ may vary, depending on κi.
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group of type θ can be obtained by
T (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
−(2κ− 1)/r
(θ − θ)(θ + 1/2− κ)dθ
=
∫ θ
θ
−(2κ− 1)/r
(θ + 1/2− κ)(θ − θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ
−(2κ− 1)/r
−(θ + 1/2− κ)(θ + 1/2− κ)dθ
=
(1− 2κ)/r
θ + 1/2− κ (log(θ − θ)− log (θ + 1/2 − κ)) + C
0
=
(1− 2κ)/r
θ + 1/2 − κ
(
log
θ − θ
θ¯ − θ + log
θ¯ + 1/2 − κ
θ + 1/2 − κ
)
where C0 =
(1− 2κ)/r
θ + 1/2 − κ
(− log(θ¯ − θ) + log(θ¯ + 1/2 − κ))
We assume that C0 is set to assure T (θ¯) = 0. Again, given concession time as a function
of θ, the expected delay of stabilization in the concession EDC is then min{T (θL), T (θR)}
with the expectation taken over F (θ).
The uncertainty about the cost to waiting of other group is important to delay stabi-
lizations. As long as groups in the process believe that someone else may have a higher θ
and then give up first, stabilization does not occur immediately. If all groups are identical,
we could interpret this as a single agent. In this case, he knows with probability 1 that
he will be the stabilizer. Thus he stabilize immediately. Meanwhile the higher θ leads to
shorter concession time. An increase in the cost, for unchanged distribution θ, will move
the expected date of a stabilization forward.
Higher κ leads to later stabilization. The gain from waiting in that one’s opponent will
concede is larger. Hence each group holds out longer. It might be hard to reach agreements
on how to allocate tax increases among interest groups.
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2.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the welfare in this economy. In the bargaining framework,
the stabilization occurs when a group accepts the offer by the other, while in the concession
framework, the stabilization occurs when a group concedes. With the interactions that two
parties take, how does the total welfare change in the process?
Proposition 7 The welfare increases as the timing of stabilization becomes earlier.
Proof. In this economy, there are two political groups which maximizes each utility
function (2.1). Hence total welfare W can be described as
W = V L + V R =
τ
r
[
e−rT (θL + θR + 1− (κL + κR)) + (−1− θL − θR)
]
=
τ
r
[e−rT (θL + θR) + (−1− θL − θR)].
We can see how W is affected when the timing of stabilization changes by differentiating
the above such as
∂W
∂T
= −τe−rT (θL + θR) ≤ 0.
This result can be interpreted intuitively as follows. There is a distortion in the economy
before stabilization. Therefore, given that the total cost of the reform does not change
irrespective of its distribution, the earlier the reform which terminates the distortion takes
place, the larger total welfare becomes.
As in the previous sections, the only solutions that we could obtain are the expected
time of delay due to two-sided uncertainty about the cost to waiting of the other group.
In the concession process, the expected delay for a group EDiC is the optimal timing for
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the group to concede given the other group has not conceded yet. Then the actual delay
TC is min{EDLC , EDRC}. In the bargaining process, the expected delay for a group EDiB is
the optimal timing for the group to offer the share given the other group is more patient
and then has not offered yet. Then the actual delay TB is min{EDLB, EDRB}.
When a group makes a decision, stabilization occurs. Therefore for a group i, EDi
can be considered as T . Hence it can be concluded that every group should recognize the
process in which the expected delay is shorter would be more desirable in terms of welfare
improving.
2.7 Comparative Simulation
In this section, by using numerical method, we will analyze the equilibrium delay in both
the bargaining and war-of-attrition setup, which has been obtained in the previous sections
under the assumption of uniform distribution of the type.
Hereafter, we consider the limiting case of bargaining model that the minimum time
between offers goes to zero as (δ → 1), in order to compare properly with the concession
setup, where the payoff is discounted only by r. Hence, as in section 2.4, given L makes
an initial offer, the expected delay in the bargaining can be obtained as
EDB =
Γ(L) if L ≥ R ≥ θ˜RΓ(L) + Γ(R | θL, θ˜R) if 0 < R < θ˜R
=
−
7
3r logL if L ≥ R ≥ 12θL
− 73r logL− 1r log 2(θR+θL)3θL . if 12θL > R > 0
Note that the cost share does not affect the time of delay as the bargaining process en-
dogenously determine the share. On the equilibrium path, groups take strategies to form a
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sequential equilibrium, where separating equilibrium may occur depending on the valuation
of the other.
2.7.1 Expected Delay in Each Process
Before direct comparison, analysing the delay in each process would be useful to examine
how groups interact in general.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Value
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Discount r
0
2
4
6
Time
Figure 2.4: Expected delay in the Bargaining Case
Figure 2.4 shows the expected delay in the bargaining case. To simplify, in Figure
2.4, we examine the the minimum delay Γ(L).15 A group becomes more impatient if
their expected gain from stabilization is larger. The group with larger expectations of
gains makes initial offer, hence makes concession earlier on. Thus the larger are gains,
stabilization occurs sooner. Also the larger is discount rate, the time of delay is more
shorten.
Figure 2.5 shows the time of delay in the war-of-attrition case. In a concession game,
the share of cost of stabilization τ is exogenously fixed. Thus the gain from stabilization,
15One can easily show that even if we plot Γ(L) + Γ(R), the big picture will not change.
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Figure 2.5: Expected Delay in the War-of-Attrition Case
which is independently drawn from distribution F , and the share κ can affect the time of
delay. A group more exposed to distortionary taxation before stabilization, that is, which
may have larger gains from stabilization, will be likely to give in immediately, leading
to immediate stabilization. If the cost share for stabilization becomes more polarized,
the expected gains or losses from waiting increases. Therefore, concession time will be
prolonged as groups become more patient. Stabilizations are delayed as long as groups
believe someone else may have a higher cost for distortion. On the contrary, if a group
recognizes his cost as the highest, no delay may occur.
2.7.2 Comparison of Expected Delay
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 compare the two setups in terms of the expected time of delay. To
simplify, we assume that discount rate r is normalized to one. In concession case, we need
to put further assumption of θi + 1/2 − κ > 0, in order to make sure that groups concede
at some point, otherwise, no one concedes due to less profit from stabilization. Thus we
consider the case of θi ∈ [0.3, 1], that is, θ = 0.3 for the concession. In the bargaining
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process, however, as the cost share is endogenously determined, the time of delay is still
independent of the value of κ. Thus, even in the range of 0 < θ < 0.3, the bargaining
process does have an equilibrium path, while the war of attrition model may have no
concession in the range.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison at κ = 0.7
Figure 2.6 implies that the bargaining process may take more time to reach an agree-
ment. At the range of higher valuation, in which a group is more impatient, the delay
in the bargaining case is longer than in the concession case. Even if a group is likely to
concede sooner, due to uncertainty at the initial period, groups have to wait in order to
make an offer which can be indifferent between acceptance and reject.
On the other hand, at the range of lower valuation, in which a group is more patient,
however, the bargaining process may hasten the stabilization rather than in the conces-
sion. This may be interpreted as an intuitive way that due to the bargaining process of
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exchanging and signaling the information, groups could make an offer to reach agreement
sooner.
Thus when interest groups are unlikely to concede, the bargaining process may hasten
the stabilization. Meanwhile, when groups are willing to settle early, the bargaining may
rather take more time to reach agreement on the stabilization due to negotiation procedure.
One can conclude that the introduction of bargaining process has a smoothing effect on
reaching an agreement of fiscal reform.
In Figure 2.7, we examine the sensitivity analysis of a change in κ. As stated above,
the expected delay in the bargaining is independent of κ.
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis of κ
If the share of cost for stabilization is more equally distributed in concession model
such as κ = 0.55, the difference between the gain from waiting and losses from concession
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becomes smaller. Then groups concede earlier, so that the bargaining process may delay
the reform in most cases.
On the other hand, when the share of cost for stabilization is more polarized such as
κ = 0.79, the gain from waiting become larger. Then groups tend to wait the other concede
longer. In this case, the bargaining process may be more useful on reaching agreement
earlier on rather than equally distributed case. Thus, in more polarized economy, the
bargaining process may work for shorter delay more effectively.
2.7.3 Policy Implications
A situation with conflicts between two major groups is seen as a divided or twisted gov-
ernment, for instance, a party which supports the president doesn’t keep the majority of
the congress, and neither of these two interest parties under presidency has enough power
to move the policy forward. From historical perspectives, distributive conflicts could lead
to such a nationwide issue – right parties tend to insist the proportional income tax and
indirect tax, while the left prefers capital tax and more progressive tax.
Such twisted governments have been often observed under democracies in recent years.
Obama Administration has experienced a divided government since 2010. The Senate,
the upper house, has been run by Democrats, which supports President Obama, while the
House of Representatives, the lower house, has been dominated by Republicans, which is
the opposition to the administration. As a result of conflicts over medicare reforms which
Democrats put their priority, the 2014 budget discussion had been suspended, and without
any compromise, a government shutdown had happened for almost one month in October
2013. According to Standard & Poors, the economic loss of the shutdown was estimated
to be 24 billions US dollars. With critiques by public, President Obama had to agree to
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compile a temporal budget for the next three months to avoid sovereign default.
In the late 90’s, Japan also faced a twisted government, where Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) had a majority of the lower house and formed the cabinet including prime minister,
while Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) dominated theupper house after the election in
1998. Then unfortunately Asian financial crises occured, and both parties had agreed to
promptly deal with the situation. Nevertheless urgent policy packages submitted by the
LDP cabinet had been intensively discussed in the Congress. At the final stage, the DPJ
had proposed the revised package, and LDP accepted the revision after back-and-forth
internal debates. The process to reach the agreement took several months, and the delay
is considered to increase the economic shock.
The U.S.’s case could be categorized as a concession game, while Japan’s case can be
seen as a sort of barganing game described in this chapter. Both cases imposed enormous
costs to the economy. In the concession process, both groups would not compromise until
reaching their upper limit of cost of waiting. Such a lack of compromise may lead to
a deadlock situation of complete fiscal inaction. In the bargaining process, both groups
would discuss the share of the cost by offering each other, but as simulations in this chapter
suggest, if groups are willing to concede earlier due to higher cost of waiting, the bargaining
game may rather take more time to reach an agreement. i.e., building a coalition doesn’t
necessariliy mean to hasten legislative process.
What should they have done differently? It is not so easy to assess how fast they would
have reached an agrement if they have taken different approaches. Once a party initiates
the political process in either way, it is hard to reverse. Then when interest parties create its
political strategy to deal with the situation, they should take into account information on
the other as much as possible and analyze which process is likely to lead to faster political
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agreement, as minimizing delay is better off to all stakeholders, improving welfare. Such
efforts could lead to obtaining better public recognition such as a responsible party.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
We analyze the political economy of fiscal policy, especially in delayed agreement on fiscal
reforms. Stabilization is often delayed even though every group benefits from it. One of
the reason is that interest groups conflicts over the distribution of the cost for stabilization.
Information aggregation process among interest groups makes the difference between war-
of-attrition model and bargaining model, where delay is used as a strategic variable.
In war-of-attrition framework, a group more exposed to distortionary taxation before
stabilization, that is, which may have larger gains from stabilization, will be likely to give in
immediately, leading to immediate stabilization. If the cost share for stabilization becomes
more polarized, the expected gains or losses from waiting increases. Therefore, concession
time will be prolonged as groups become more patient. Stabilizations are delayed as long
as groups believe someone else may have a higher cost for distortion. On the contrary, if
a group recognizes his cost as the highest, no delay may occur.
In bargaining framework, a group becomes more impatient if their expected gain from
stabilization is larger. Then the group with larger expectations of gains makes initial offer,
hence makes concession earlier on. Initial offer is only accepted if the gain are sufficiently
large. Thus the larger are gains, stabilization occurs sooner. Also the larger is discount
rate, the time of delay is more shortened.
The comparison of two models implies that the introduction of information aggregation
process makes the difference in the expected delay between concession and bargaining
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setup. When interest groups are unlikely to concede, the bargaining process may hasten
the stabilization. Meanwhile, when groups are willing to settle earlier, the bargaining may
rather take more time to reach agreement on the reform due to uncertainty. Furthermore, in
more polarized economy, the bargaining process may work for shorter delay more effectively.
Some policy implications can be obtained by this outcome. Intuitively, the bargaining
procedure seems to hasten the legislative process in any case, but this chapter shows that
under certain condition where groups are willing to concede early due to higher cost of
waiting, the bargaining may take more time to reach an agreement. In that case, it would
be more efficient to keep a dead locked situation without calling on the other to start
bargaining process.
2.9 Appendix
Lemma 3 The payoff function in Alesina and Drazen (1991) satisfies the single crossing
property.
Proof. In Alesina and Drazen (1991), payoff function is defined as
U(θ;T, α) =
∫ T
0
uDi (x)e
−rx dx+ e−rTV j(T )
=
∫ T
0
[
−τ(x)
2
− θiτ(x)
]
e−rx dx+ e−rT
−αjτ(T )
r
=
∫ T
0
[
−
(
1
2
+ θi
)
γrb¯e(1−γ)rx
]
e−rx dx+ e−rT
−αj
r
rb¯e(1−γ)rx
=
∫ T
0
−
(
1
2
+ θi
)
γrb¯e−γrx dx− αj b¯e−γrx.
43
Hence, we obtain
dU
dT
= −
(
1
2
+ θi
)
γrb¯e−γrx + γrαj b¯e−γrx
=
(
αj − 1
2
− θi
)
γrb¯e−γrx < 0
dU
dα
= −b¯e−γrx < 0.
Therefore, the slope of indifference curve [T, α] becomes
−dU
dT
/dU
dα
= −
(
αj − 12 − θi
)
γrb¯e−γrx
−b¯e−γrx
=
(
αj − 1
2
− θi
)
γr.
This suggests that this indifference curve is strictly decreasing in θ.
Proof of Proposition 1 We need to show that L’s strategy is optimal given the belief
and strategies of R when L believes R = θR.
Suppose L ≥ θ0L. An immediate counter offer by L implies L = θ0L. The counter
offer α(θ0L, θR) is accepted by R with probability one. Then L accepts the offer α if
L− α ≥ δ(L− α(θ0L, θR)), given that offering α(θ0L, θR) without delay is the optimal.
If L offer a α’ after a delay ∆, R believes θL = θL(∆ | θR, θ0L). The deviation from
offering α(θL, θR) makes losses; offering α
′ > α(θL, θR) yields losses, as R accepts this with
probability one. offering α′ < α(θL, θR) also yields losses, as R counter offer α(θR, θL) >
α(θL, θR). Then L’s optimal offer is α(θL, θR) with optimal delay ∆.
L’s expected payoff from offering α(θL, θR) after ∆ is U
L(∆) = e−r∆(L − α(θL, θR)).
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Recalling (2) and (7),
∂UL
∂∆
= −r e−r∆(L− α(θL)) + e−r∆
(
− ∂α
∂θL
∂θL
∂∆
)
= −r e−r∆
(
L− δL−R
1 + δ
− (θR + θ
0
L)e
− r∆
δ
1 + δ
)
= −r e−r∆
(
θR − (θR + θ0L)e−
r∆
δ + L
)
< 0
Then the optimal delay ∆ is zero.
Suppose L < θ0L. As above, if L ≥ θL, optimal offer is α(θL) and R infers L = θL. As
θL(∆) = (θR + θ
0
L)e
− rΓ
δ − θR holds, ∂UL/∂∆ = 0 if ∆ = Γ(L). Hence for L < θL, L’s
optimal behavior is by rejecting α(θR) and offering α(L, θR) after delay Γ(L |θR, θ0L).
Along the equilibrium path L = θL and R = θR, stabilization occurs with probability
one at each share.
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose R ≥ θ0R. if R makes a counter offer after ∆, L infers
R = θR(∆ | θL, θ0R). But, Proposition 1 suggests R’s optimal counter offer is α(θ0R, θL)
without delay. Thus R accepts α(θL) without delay if R+ α ≥ δ(R+ α(θ0R, θL)).
Suppose R < θ0R. counter-offer after ∆ reveals R = θR(∆ | θL, θ0R). But then we
proceed to the subgame with complete information in Proposition 1. In this subgame, R’s
optimal response is to offer α(R, θL) after delay of Γ(R | θL, θ0R), which is accepted without
delay by L.
Along equilibrium path, θ0R = θ˜R and R < θR(∆). Thus, if R ≥ θ˜R(θL, α), acceptance
of α is optimal, as R ≥ θ˜R(θL, α) holds if and only if R+ α ≥ δ(R+ α(θ˜R, θL)).
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose L makes a revealing offer α(θL, θ˜R). The offer is
accepted if R ∈ [θ˜R, θR], otherwise, after a delay Γ, L accepts R’s counter offer α(R, θL),
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where the payoff is discounted by
δe−rΓ(R|θL,θ˜R) = δ
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
as Γ = −δ
r
log
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
Then L’s expected flow payoff from offering α(θL, θ˜R) is given by U˜
L, which is continuous
on [0, θR], such as
U˜L(L, θ˜R |θL, θR) = [F (θR)−F (θ˜R)][L−α(θL, θ˜R)]+
∫ θ˜R
0
δ(L−α(R, θL))
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
dF (R).
L could choose θ˜R to maximize her utility as α and θ˜R are the correspondence. In equilib-
rium path at L = θL, L’s marginal utility from θ˜R is as follows;
∂U˜L(θL)
∂θ˜R
= −F (θR)∂α(θL, θ˜R)
∂θ˜R
− f(θ˜R)L+ f(θ˜R)α+ F (θ˜R)∂α(θL, θ˜R)
∂θ˜R
+
∂
∂θ˜R
∫ θ˜R
0
δ(L− α(R, θL))
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
dF (R)
=
1
1 + δ
(
F (θR)− F (θ˜R)− (θ˜R + θL)f(θ˜R)
)
+
δ2
1 + δ
(
(θ˜R + θL)f(θ˜R)− δ
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)1+δ
dF (R)
)
Thus, if U˜L is maximized,
F (θR)− F (θ˜R)− (1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL) = δ3
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)1+δ
dF (R)
holds. Furthermore, as U˜ ′ < 0 at θ˜R = θR and U˜ ′ > 0 at θ˜R = 0, at some point of
θ˜R ∈ [0, θR], the maximum occurs. Then U˜ ′′ is given by
(1 + δ)
∂U˜ ′
∂θ˜R
= (δ2 − 2)f(θ˜R)− (1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL)f ′(θ˜R)− δ3 ∂
∂θ˜R
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)1+δ
dF (R)
= (−δ3 + δ2 − 2)f(θ˜R)− (1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL)f ′(θ˜R)
+ δ3(1 + δ)
∫ θ˜R
0
(R+ θL)
1+δ
(θ˜R + θL)2+δ
dF (R).
Thus, in order to have a unique solution, we assume the distribution F satisfies
(−δ3+δ2−2)f(θ˜R)−(1−δ2)(θ˜R+θL)f ′(θ˜R)+δ3(1+δ)
∫ θ˜R
0
(R+ θL)
1+δ
(θ˜R + θL)2+δ
dF (R) < 0, (2.12)
as u˜′ is strictly decreasing over θ˜R if this holds.
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Proof of Proposition 4 We assume (2.9) holds to specify θ˜R(θL). L makes a revealing
offer after delay ∆ ≥ Γ(L), given that R’s strategy is θR(∆) and that R believes L makes
θL(∆).
Case 1; R ∈ [0, θ˜R(θL(∆))]. L reveals first after ∆, and R reject the offer. Then R
counter α(R, θL) after delay Γ. The offer is accepted immediately. Thus the expected
payoff of L is
e−r∆ e−rΓ δ(L− α(R, θL)) = 1
1 + δ
δ e−r∆
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
((1 + δ)L+ δR− θL).
Case 2; R ∈ [θ˜R(θL(∆)), θR(∆)]. L offer α(θL, θ˜R) after ∆ and R accepts immediately.
The expected payoff is
e−r∆ (L− α(θL, θ˜R)) = 1
1 + δ
e−r∆
(
(1 + δ)L+ θ˜R − δθL
)
.
Case 3; R ∈ [θR(∆), θR(Γ(θL))]. R reveals first with α(R, θ˜L) after Γ(R), and L accepts
immediately as L > θ˜L(θLΓ(R)). Then the expected payoff is
e−rΓ(R) (L− α(R, θ˜L)) = 1
1 + δ
e−rΓ(R)
(
(1 + δ)L+ δR− θ˜L
)
.
The total expected payoff of L is calculated by integrating the above payoffs for each range
such as
(1 + δ)UL(L,∆) =
∫ θ˜R(θL)
0
e−r∆
(
(1 + δ)L+ θ˜R − δθL
)
f(R)dR
+ [F (θR(∆))− F (θ˜R(θL))]e−r∆
(
(1 + δ)L+ θ˜R − δθL
)
+
∫ θR(Γ(L))
θR(∆)
e−rΓ(R)
(
(1 + δ)L+ δR− θ˜L
)
f(R)dR.
A necessary condition for Γ(L) to be a best response is that the marginal utility of delay is
zero at L = θL(∆). Taking the derivative of the above with respect to ∆ and substituting
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L = θL(∆) yields
(1 + δ)
∂UL
∂∆
= δe−r∆
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ [
(δ2 − 1)θ′L − δ(R+ θL)
(
r + δ
θ˜R
′
+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)]
+ θ˜R
′
e−r∆δ2(θ˜R + θL)f(θ˜R)
+ e−r∆(F (θR)− F (θ˜R))×
[(θ˜R
′ − δθ′L − r(θ˜R + θL)) + (θ˜R + θL)(f(θR) θ′R − f(θ˜R) θ˜R
′
)]
− e−r∆ θ′R (δθR − θ˜L + (1 + δ)θL) f(θR).
Hence, ∂UL/∂∆ = 0 can be written as
0 = [F (θL)− F (θ˜R)][θ˜R′ − δθ′L − r(θ˜R + θL)] + θ′Rf(θR)(θ˜R + θ˜L − δ(θR + θL))
− θ˜R′f(θ˜R)(1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL) + δ(δ2 − 1)θ′L
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
dF (R)
−
(r
δ
(θ˜R + θL) + (θ˜R
′
+ θ′L)
)∫ θ˜R
0
δ3
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)1+δ
dF (R).
By using the first order condition (2.8) and multiplying δ, we obtain
0 = [F (θL)− F (θ˜R)]×
[−δ(1 + δ)θ′L − r(1 + δ)(θ˜R + θL)) + δθ′Rf(θR)(θ˜R + θ˜L − δ(θR + θL))
+ r(1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL)2 f(θ˜R) + δ f(θ˜R)(θ˜R + θL)(1− δ2)θ′L
+ δ2(δ2 − 1)θ′L
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
dF (R).
As θL(∆) = θR(∆) and then θ˜L(θR(∆)) = θ˜R(θL(∆)), substituting these and dividing by
1 + δ yields
0 = −(δθ′L + r(θ˜R + θL)[F (θL)− F (θ˜R)− (1− δ)(θ˜R + θL)f(θ˜R)]
+δ2(δ − 1)θ′L
∫ θ˜R
0
(
R+ θL
θ˜R + θL
)δ
dF (R) +
δ
1 + δ
θ′Lf(θL)(2θ˜R − 2δθL).
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Assuming that c(θL) = F (θL)−F (θ˜R)−(1−δ)(θ˜R+θL)f(θ˜R), q(θL) = δ2(δ−1)
∫ (
R+θL
θ˜R+θL
)δ
dF (R)
and k(θL) =
δ
1+δf(θL)(2θ˜R− 2δθL), the first order differential equation can be obtained as
θ′L =
∂θL(∆)
∂∆
=
r(θ˜R + θL)c(θL)
q(θL) + k(θL)− δc(θL)
⇔ Γ(L) =
∫ L
0
q(θL) + k(θL)− δc(θL)
r(θ˜R + θL)c(θL)
dθL.
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider θ˜R(θL) which maximizes U˜
L(θL, θ˜R | θL, θR). Since
(2.9) is satisfied for δ > 0, θ˜R(θL) maximizes the expected payoff by binding (2.8). As
F (R) = R and L = θL, (2.8) becomes;
θR − θ˜R − (1− δ2)(θ˜R + θL) = δ
3
(θ˜R + θL)1+δ
∫ θ˜R
0
(R+ θL)
1+δdR =
δ3
2 + δ
(θ˜R + θL)
⇔ θR − 2θ˜R − θL + 2δ
2
2 + δ
(θ˜R + θL) = 0
⇔ θ˜R = 2 + δ
4 + 2δ − 2δ2 θR +
2δ2 − 2− δ
4 + 2δ − 2δ2 θL.
Since θL(∆) = θR(∆), we can transform this as
θ˜R =
2δ2
4 + 2δ − 2δ2 θL = (2γ − 1)θL where γ =
2 + δ
4 + 2δ − 2δ2 .
Hence, by substituting, we obtain
q(θL) =
2δ2(δ − 1)γ
1 + δ
θL, k(θL) =
2δ(2γ − δ − 1)
1 + δ
θL, and c(θL) = 2(δγ − 2γ + 1)θL.
As θ′L = r(θ˜R + θL)c(θL)/(q(θL) + k(θL)− δc(θL)), θ′L can be written as
θ′L =
2r(1 + δ)γ(γδ − 2γ + 1)
δ(4γ − 2δ − γδ − 2) θL.
Then, since θ′L = ∂θL/∂∆,
Γ(L) =
∫ L
0
δ(4γ − 2δ − γδ − 2)
2r(1 + δ)γ(γδ − 2γ + 1)
1
θL
dθL =
δ(4γ − 2δ − γδ − 2)
2r(1 + δ)γ(γδ − 2γ + 1) logL.
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Proof of Lemma 2 Differentiating the expected payoff with respect to Ti, we obtain
∂EV
∂T
= (1−H)
(
u(T )e−rT − re−rT u
L
r
+ e−rT
∂(uL/r)
∂T
)
− h
(∫ T
0
u(t)e−rtdt+ e−rT
uL
r
)
+
(∫ T
0
u(t)e−rtdt+ e−rT
uW
r
)
h
= e−rT
[
h(T )
(−uL + uW
r
)
+ (1−H(T )(u− uL)
]
= e−rT
[
h(T )
(2κ− 1)τ
r
+ (1−H(T ))
(
−θ − 1
2
+ κ
)
τ
]
.
Differentiating with respect to θi, we obtain
∂2EV
∂T∂θ
= e−rT (−(1−H(T )) < 0.
This implies that when others are acting optimally, dEV/dT is decreasing in θ. Therefore
concession time Ti is monotonically decreasing in θi.
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose the other interest group acts according to the optimal
concession time T (θ). Choosing Ti would be equal to choosing a value θˆ and conceding at
time Ti = T (θˆi). As T is monotonically decreasing in θ, we can derive the relation between
H(Ti) and F (θi), as 1−H(T (θi)) = F (θi). By changing the variables, we obtain
EP (θˆ, θ) = F (θˆ)
[∫ θ¯
θˆ
−u(x)e−rT (x)T ′(x)dx+ e−rT (θˆ)u
L(T (θi))
r
]
+
∫ θ¯
θˆ
[∫ θ¯
x
−u(x)e−rT (z)T ′(z)dz + e−rT (x)u
W (T (x))
r
]
f(x)dx.
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Differentiating with respect to θˆ, we can obtain
∂EP
∂θˆ
= f(θˆ)
[∫ θ¯
θˆ
−ue−rT (x)T ′(x)dx+ e−rT (θˆ)u
L
r
]
+ F (θˆ)
[
−ue−rT (θˆ)T ′(θˆ)− rT ′(θˆ)e−rT (θˆ)u
L
r
+ e−rT
∂(uL/r)
∂T
∂T
∂θˆ
]
+
(∫ θ¯
θˆ
u(x)e−rT (x)dx+ e−rT (θˆ)
uW
r
)
f(θˆ) = 0
⇔ −f(θˆ)
(
uW − uL
r
)
+ F (θˆ)
(
u(θ, θˆ)− ru
L
r
)
T ′(θˆ)
= −f(θˆ)
(
2κ− 1
r
)
τ + F (θˆ)
(
−θ − 1
2
+ κ
)
τT ′(θˆ) = 0.
As T (θ) is the optimal time of concession for a group with cost θ, θˆ = θ when θˆ is
chosen optimally. Hence first order condition evaluated θˆ = θ becomes the equation in this
proposition.
As for the boundary condition, for any value of θ < θˆ, the gain from waiting until
other’s concession is positive. Thus groups with θ < θˆ will not concede immediately. Then
a group with θ = θˆ will find it optimal to choose T (θˆ) = 0 as the group knows it has the
highest possible cost of waiting.
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Chapter 3
Leader’s Reputation and Sovereign
Default
3.1 Introduction
The question of whether reputational concerns are sufficient to sustain repayment incentives
for sovereign borrowers is a long standing one. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) were the first
to formalize the reputational argument that if debtors do not build up a reputation for
repayment, they would lose access to future lending. Bulow and Rogoff (1989), however,
showed in their seminal paper that the reputational incentive breaks down if countries can
save, as then there will be some period when they would prefer to default on debt. A series
of papers subsequently tried to restore the reputational argument: e.g. Cole et al. (1995);
Cole and Kehoe (1997) use reputational spillovers from other valuable relationships while
Kletzer and Wright (2000) focused on technological restrictions on the assets available for
saving or collusions among creditors to reduce the assets available to the country after
0As declared, this chapter is a joint work with Amrita Dhillon and Tomas Sjo¨stro¨m, partly based on the
previous version, Dhillon and Sjostrom (2009).
52
default.
A more recent literature (Guembel and Sussman (2009) and Amador (2003)) has fo-
cused on resolving Bulow and Rogoff (1989) critique by focusing on the politics of repaying
foreign debt. A basic assumption of the reputational models is that there is one representa-
tive agent who is essentially “the country”, and reputation always attaches to the country.
Incentives to repay come from the need to have access to lending in the future. Some
of the political economy models relax this assumption. While Amador (2003) shows how
democracies end up with too little savings, due to the pressures of party politics, they are
able to commit to repay the debt which becomes valuable because of its contingent nature.
Guembel and Sussman (2009) focus on the heterogeneity of groups in the population of the
debtor country: there are some groups in the country (bondholders) who want repayment
and others who do not and repayment takes place when the pivotal voter is a domestic
bondholder.
In this chapter, we handle the Bulow-Rogoff critique in a different way. A debtor
country starts off by needing loans from foreigners as they do not have enough savings to
begin with. In the second period, however, they are able to save enough so that domestic
debt can substitute for foreign debt (capturing the situation described by Bulow and Rogoff
(1989)). For simplicity, we assume that there is a representative citizen who is only a
taxpayer in the first period but a bondholder in the second period. Leaders and citizen’s
incentives are aligned and thus, both citizens and leaders have incentives to default on
repayment in the first period. However, leaders are of two types, and the type is private
information to the leader: the leader can be of a competence, and the ability level is
known only to himself.1 Citizens are interested in knowing the type of leader for their
1One of notable characteristics of our model is to generalize the type of leaders and analyze the incentive
structure. The low ability leader could have a different cost function to repay the debt.
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second period decision of lending. If the leader is revealed to be of low ability, they would
prefer to lend their money abroad rather than to the leader in a dictatorship, or replace
the leader in a democracy. The high ability leader is able to guarantee high enough returns
that citizens would like to lend to him. In addition, the high ability leader can repay the
debt to foreigners without incurring too high a cost in the first period relative to the low
ability leader. This creates situations where low ability leaders default in the first period,
and the high ability leader repays in order to separate himself from the low ability leader.
We show that the rate of interest at which the debtor country can borrow is lower when
the difference between the two types is smaller and when the probability of the low ability
leader is lower. Incomplete information about the type of leader provides a way to link
incentives of domestic bondholders with those of foreign bondholders so that there is an
endogenous positive probability that the loan will be repaid. Ultimately reputation in the
repayment of foreign debt is linked to repayment of domestic debt. As long as the leader
is “accountable” to the citizenry, the reputational basis for lending is restored.
A natural question then is to ask how the incentives to repay differ among different
political systems? In this chapter, we compare the incentives to repay in democracies
where leaders are easily replaced and dictatorships where they are not. We show that in
the optimal state contingent contract, citizens replace leaders who default inefficiently in
democracies, so that lenders are willing to lend again as the reputation of the new leader
starts from the baseline priors again. In dictatorship, citizens may not lend to dictators
after default, whenever this reveals that he is not credit-worthy. We show what would
happen in an optimal (implicitly) state contingent contract, where the only problem is
enforceability of the debt. We compare democracies and dictatorships again, to examine the
risk sharing features of the two systems. While the political science literature has focused
on the better commitment power of democracies (e.g. Schultz and Weingast (2003)),
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there is not a lot of theoretical work examining exactly why they can commit even if
“accountability” is cited as the main reason. We define accountability in this chapter as
the ability to throw out an incompetent or dishonest leader. This does lead to a certain
type of commitment power but even in autocracies, as long as domestic citizens are able
to deny credit to a leader, then there is an ability to commit to repay.
There is much evidence to suggest that lenders and rating agencies care about the
leader’s reputation. Indeed, Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) say that “When assessing
a country’s willingness and ability to service its debt, rating agencies will generally take
into consideration a country’s political risk and economic risk. Political risk assessment
evaluates a country’s underlying political and social stability, which impacts the central
government’s willingness to meet its debt obligations. The main criteria used include
the characteristics of a political system, executive leadership, government institutions,
social coalitions, social indicators, and external relations.” A recent and emerging empirical
literature recognizes the fact that there may be a link between political turnover and
default incentives, e.g. Brewer and Rivoli (1990) show that perception of creditworthiness
is negatively correlated with the frequency of regime change. Bordo and Oosterlinck (2005)
analyze the gold standard period (1880-1913) for 29 countries and study whether defaults
are linked to political turnover. They find that average (over 33 years) political instability
in defaulting countries is not much higher than non-defaulting countries. Saiegh (2005)
studies 43 countries from 1971-1997, but concludes that being a democracy is insufficient
to predict default. He compares countries which have multi-party coalitional governments
with single party governments and finds that the former have lower default rates. His
theory is that multi party coalitions prevent re-distributive transfers from asset holders
to tax payers (assuming that if international debt is repudiated then at some point it
induces a transfer among the domestic agents). McGillivray and Smith (2003) (henceforth
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MS) compare democracies and autocracies for default risk and fluctuations in bond prices.
They find higher fluctuations in non democracies. Overall conclusion in theory comes
out in favor of democracies: higher turnover associated theoretically with lower default,
lower risk premia, lower volatility. Empirically, on the other hand, results on turnover and
default seem to be mixed.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 then
discusses the optimal contracts under both dictatorship and democracy. Section 4 compares
the two cases. Section 5 discusses the ideas of extensions, and an extended case of income
heterogeneity among the agents, and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Set-up
There is one borrower country with a set of citizens normalized to size one. The leader
of the country under democracy is a politician who is chosen from among the citizens. In
dictatorship, the leader cannot be ousted at all.
The leader of the country is a “High” ability type with probability 1− ; and a “Low”
ability type with probability . His true type, α ∈ (H,L), is his private information. If
the leader is a high ability type, then he is able to successfully handle the economic policy
to finance the repayment with a lower cost in the first period, and in the second period
he creates a higher vale from the project than the low ability leader. With a probability
 > 0, the leader is a “low” ability type who bears a higher cost α to manage the debt
repayment. The difference in ability would impose the additional cost on making a policy,
e.g. delayed reform, and inefficient process in the government discussion. The existence of
“low” types makes different default decisions possible.
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The leader’s interests are perfectly aligned with the representative agent in the economy,
as he internalizes the representative agent’s payoff. In addition, under democracy, the
leader also get ego rents E from being in office. He receives the utility from enacting
policies that are in the public interest, and building a legacy by being re-elected. We can
interpret this to mean that the leader is the representative citizen of the country, who gets
the same payoff as other citizens, plus the rents from office under democracy.
There are two periods. In each period, the leader has access to an investment project.
The size of the period t project is denoted qt. A project qt generates income yt = (1 + ρ)qt
for the representative citizen, which is equally distributed through transfers. For now, we
assume the size qt is exogenously fixed. Then in period t, the leader either implements a
project of fixed size qt, or implements no project.
3.2.2 Period 1
At the beginning of period 1, the representative citizens receive an endowment w1. We
assume w1 < q1 so that the citizens do not have sufficient funds to finance the project in
t = 1. Then the first period project must be financed by a loan of q1 dollars from foreign
lenders. The interest rate is r1, so that the government repayment including interests is
(1 + r1)q1.
After the project q1 is implemented, there is a stochastic shock λ to the economy.
The cumulative distribution is F : The support of F is an interval [1,K]. We refer to λ
as the state of the world. We assume that λ is observable, so the loan contract can be
state-contingent. This captures the possibility of re-negotiation conditional on the state.
A state-contingent contract specifies that the country must repay R(λ) = q1(1 + r1(λ)) at
the end of period 1. The higher is λ, the more likely it is that the country repay, so the
risk premium is lower. Therefore, r1 is decreasing in λ.
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The state λ determines the shadow value of money: making a repayment of R costs the
representative citizen and the leaders αλR dollars. The shock λ is public information but
how it is managed is not public. We assume that a competent leader will have α = 1 but
the incompetent leader will have α > 1. Thus the low ability leader incurs the additional
cost of repayment to the leader’s payoff such that αλR > λR, which could make a difference
on default decisions among leaders. The payoff of repayment to citizens in the first period
is y1 − αλR(λ) if the bad leader is in power, and y1 − λR(λ) otherwise.
After observing λ, the incumbent leader decides whether to (a) raise (1+r1)q1 dollar tax
revenue at a cost αλR(λ), and repay the loan; or (b) default and repay nothing. Because
no international court of law is set to be able to force the country to honor the contract,
the contract must be incentive compatible: the leader is expected to voluntarily repay
R(λ) in state λ if his payoff on repaying is larger than non repayment and default. The
representative agent’s first-period income must be large enough that the government can
raise enough taxes to repay the loan. The feasibility constraint is as below:
y1 ≥ αλR(λ), (3.1)
for every λ, otherwise there is no lending in the period one.2
Under democracy, at the end of period 1, elections are held and the leader would stay
on or be replaced by a political draw from the pool. Citizens have incentives to replace
the incumbent leader who defaults when the default is not efficient, otherwise the leader
is re-elected. The citizens maximize their consumption in t = 1. We do not model the
savings decision, leaving it for an extension.
2In an extreme case such as λ → ∞, (3.1) may not be met. Then the leader would choose a default
because of the feasibility constraint, rather than a strategic default. Notice that in this case, incentive
compatibility constraint must be binding.
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We assume that the international credit market is competitive and that the foreign
lenders must expect to make zero profit.3 Since there is no discounting, the lender’s (ex-
ante) zero profit condition is ∫ L
1
R(λ)dF (λ) = q1. (3.2)
If in state λ the leader pays strictly less than R(λ), we define that he defaults on the loan.
As shown in below, it is clear that if he defaults, his best option is to pay nothing at all
due to the optimal contract.
3.2.3 Period 2
At the beginning of period 2, the representative citizen receives an endowment w2, which
is equally distributed. Because the model has only two periods, the action in the second
period is different from the period one. Since there is not period three, there is no need to
build a reputation in period two. Thus there is no reason to repay for foreign bond-holders.
Therefore, in the second period, borrowing can only be from domestic agents. The model
could be easily extended to many periods model, where the reputation motive operates
in all periods except the last. To make lending possible in period 2, we assume w2 ≥ q2;
so the representative citizen has enough loanable funds in to finance a public project in
period 2. With these funds, the leader implements the project y2.
We assume for simplicity that there are no shocks in period 2, and the shadow value of
a dollar at the end of period 2 is one, i.e., λ = 1. Under these assumptions, second-period
behavior becomes straightforward. Domestic lenders can choose to lend to the leader or
to invest their money abroad at a rate of interest r2. We assume that the earnings abroad
3Assuming a small open economy, the foreign investor should demand the interest rate equivalent to the
world rate r∗1 . For simplicity, we assume r
∗
1 = 0 without loss of generality.
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in the second period are such that the high ability leader can make more by investing
in the project y2 while the low ability leader is less productive than investing abroad:
y2 − q2 > r2q2 > y2α − q2.4 If a project takes place, the leader is willing to repay since the
bond-holder is the representative citizen, i.e., the leader himself.
In Section 3, we derive the optimal contracts under the two assumptions: In Section
3.1 the first-period leader always remains the leader in period 2. This might correspond to
a “dictatorship” or “autocracy” or even a “democracy with low turnover”. In Section 3.2,
we assume instead that the citizens can replace the first-period leader by a new leader at
the end of period 1, corresponding to a de facto“ democracy”.
3.3 Optimal Contract
In this section we will discuss the optimal contracts in the two cases.
3.3.1 Optimal Contract with No Replacement of Leader: Autocracy
In this section, we assume the leader cannot be replaced after period 1.5 λ is observed by
creditors but they cannot enforce repayment. We will show that there is a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, where there exists a threshold λ = λˆ such that the citizens choose not to lend
to the leader in the second period if there is default for λ < λˆ in the first period, and lend
to the leader otherwise. The low ability leader always defaults and the high ability leader
defaults only when λ ≥ λˆ.
4When a dictator defaults in t = 1, it would be a possibility to impose additional interest rates or
spreads on the lending in t = 2 as a punishment to a defaulting leader. Nevertheless, the representative
citizen is indifferent in raising the interest rate, as he is a taxpayer to pay the additional interest, but also
a bondholder who receives the interest.
5This can be generalised to replacement with a certain cost.
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Consider the low ability leader: the cost of repayment is αλR(λ) and the additional
benefit of repayment is 0: since he has the same utility as the representative citizen, he
benefits by defaulting and letting citizens lend their money abroad. This is because he can
only produce y2α < (1 + r2)q2 in period 2.
Given this, when does the high ability leader repay? The incentive compatibility con-
straint requires that, in each state λ, the leader prefers to repay R(λ), at a cost λR(λ),
rather than defaulting and paying nothing.
When the leader cannot be replaced, the incentive to repay comes from the value of his
reputation: if he fails to repay when λ < λˆ, he will be believed to be a low ability leader
and then will not get a new loan in period two. Citizens will invest abroad instead.If he
repays R(λ), in period 2 he will be able to borrow q2 from the representative citizen, and
implement a second-period project, which yields a net benefit y2 − q2, the same as the
representative citizen’s benefit. Accordingly, the incentive-compatibility constraint for the
high ability leader to repay is
y1 − λR(λ) + y2 − q2 ≥ y1 + r2q2,
or
λR(λ) ≤ y2 − (1 + r2)q2 (3.3)
for all λ.
The optimal contract minimizes the expected cost of repayment of the borrower:∫ K
1
(1− )λR(λ)dF (λ) (3.4)
by choice of R(λ) subject to the lender’s feasibility constraint (3.2) and the incentive
constraint (3.3) above. Clearly, it is optimal to pay as much as possible in good states
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where λ is low, and as little as possible in bad states where λ is high. In terms of the IC
constraint (3.3), the optimal contract will have a following form: There is a cutoff point
λˆ, such that R(λ) = (y2 − (1 + r2)q2)/λ for λ ≤ λˆ, and R(λ) = 0 for λ > λˆ.
Citizen’s beliefs are that whenever they see a default for λ < λˆ, they believe the leader
is the low ability type, and will invest abroad in t = 2. These beliefs are consistent with
the equilibrium strategies of the two types. Given this belief, the H type has no incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium repayment R(λ) for λ < λˆ, as the expected utility from
investing the project in t = 2 with repaying R(λ) in t = 1 is always higher than the
expected utility from investing abroad with lower repayment or default in t = 1.6 The
low type leader always defaults, given his incentive constraints. This is consistent with the
beliefs of the citizens.
With this contract, the lender’s zero-profit constraint (3.2) can be written as∫ λˆ
1
(1− ) (y2 − (1 + r2)q2)
λ
dF (λ) +
∫ K
λˆ
0 dF (λ) = q1,
or ∫ λˆ
1
1
λ
dF (λ) =
q1
(1− )(y2 − (1 + r2)q2) . (3.5)
This equation determines cutoff point λˆ. For example, if λ is uniformly distributed on
6Technically, the H leader could choose a strategic default R = 0 in t = 1. Given the possibility, the
citizens could not update their beliefs on the type of the leader, even when they see a default for λ < λˆ.
Under these circumstances, the expected utility for the citizens to invest the project in t = 2 would be
(1 −  + /α)y2 − q2. Since this is set to be higher than r2q2, the citizens may invest the project even if
he defaults, and therefore the H leader also could have an incentive to default always. However, such an
equilibrium will have no lending in t = 1, i.e. q1 = 0 by (3.2), causing an opportunity loss of y1 − λR. In
addition, this is unrealistic, as the country will never get the loan from foreign lenders. Hence, we do not
consider the possibility.
62
[1,K], then equation (3.5) yields λˆ = exp
{ q1(K−1)
(1−)(y2−(1+r2)q2)
}
. The condition for λˆ ≥ 1 is
K − 1 ≥ 0, given q1 > 0 and ρ > r2.
Proposition 8 When the leader cannot be replaced, the optimal contract specifies R(λ) =
(y2 − (1 + r2)q2)/λ for λ ≤ λˆ, and R(λ) = 0 for λ > λˆ, where λˆ is implicitly defined by
(3.5). If the leader defaults on this contract, the citizens will not give new loans in period
two and invest abroad. The beliefs that support this equilibrium are that whenever they see
a default for λ < λˆ, they believe the leader is the low ability type.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice is that the repayment R(λ) is maximal in the best state λ0, i.e., λ = 1. While
we could interpret R(λ0) = (y2 − (1 + r2)q2) as the face value of the debt, there should
be partial forgiveness of the debt whenever λ is such that 1 < λ ≤ λˆ. In these states, the
leader’s repayment R(λ) satisfies 0 < R(λ) < R(λ0). If the state is very bad, λ > λˆ, then
the lenders would forgive 100% of the debt, i.e., R(λ) = 0.
This contract is optimal because it allows the country to repay nothing in bad states
as possible. The primary motivation is risk-sharing: it is very costly for the country to
repay in bad states. A low cut-off λˆ means the risk-sharing works very well, because
repayment occurs only in good states.7 From (3.5), λˆ is increasing in q1 and decreasing in
y2− (1 + r2)q2. Intuitively, it is obvious that if the loan size q1 increases, the country must
repay more often to allow foreign lenders to break even. Thus, λˆ increases in q1.
7While the foreign lender is risk neutral, he allows borrowers to default when economic shock is large
enough. In return, repayments in good states are set to be larger under the optimal contract. We call this
situation as a risk sharing, as cost of the consequenses of a risk, i.e., economic shock, is distributed between
lender and borrower in a form of variation in repayment, maximizing their utilities.
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R(λ)
λλ0 λ1^λ2^
Figure 3.1: Repayment Schedule in Dictatorship
Also, notice is that the leader’s incentive to repay depends on his reputation: if he is
believed to be a low ability type, he will not be able to borrow money in period 2. The
opportunity cost of losing second period loan is worth y2 − (1 + r2)q2. When the leader
cannot be replaced, the value of his reputation is simply the value that he will forgo if his
reputation is bad. If y2− (1 + r2)q2 increases, then his incentive to repay the loan goes up.
Therefore, it is incentive-compatible to promise to repay more with an increase in R. On
the other hand, given the zero profit constraint (3.2), as a consequence of the upward shift
of his repayment schedule, λˆ is decreasing, i.e., from λˆ1 to λˆ2 in Figure 3.1. This makes
it possible to reduce the repayment in bad states, thus improve risk-sharing. Hence when
the value of his reputation goes up, he will repay more in each good state but default more
often under the optimal contract.
64
3.3.2 Optimal Contracts with Replacement of Leader: Democracy
The contract of the previous section would break down if the representative citizen could
replace the leader between period one and two. If a leader continues to be in office in t = 2,
he gets an ego rent E. When a leader is replaced, the probability of having a high type
leader in t = 2 is still 1 − . We assume that  is small enough that domestic lenders are
willing to lend to the new leader rather than investing abroad in t = 2. Then when the
citizens replace a leader in t = 1, the expected utility in t = 2 of the domestic lenders is
(1− + /α)y2 − q2, and is set to be higher than r2q2. Citizens would replace the leader
when he is likely to be a low type, since y2α − q2 < (1− + /α)y2 − q2.
We will show that there is an optimal contract where there exists a threshold λ∗H such
that the citizens replace the leader in the first period if there is a default for λ < λ∗H
in the first period, and re-elect the leader otherwise. Citizen’s beliefs are that if default
is observed below threshold λ∗H∗, they believe the leader is a low type, and above the
threshold, they have the prior beliefs. The low ability leader always defaults and the high
ability leader repays only when λ ≤ λ∗H .
Under incentive-compatibility constraints, a low ability leader repays the loan only
when he can continue to be in office in t = 2 to get E, even if he is less productive in the
next period. Thus he would repay only if
−αλR(λ) + y2
α
+ E ≥
(
1− + 
α
)
y2,
or
αλR(λ) ≤ E + (1− )
(
1
α
− 1
)
y2. (3.6)
Then there is a cutoff point λ∗L such that he repays
RL(λ) =
E + (1− )( 1α − 1)y2
αλ
, (3.7)
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whenever λ ≤ λ∗L. When λ > λ∗L, then the low ability type prefers to default in any cases.
The incentive-compatibility constraint of the high ability leader to repay is
−λR(λ) + y2 + E ≥
(
1− + 
α
)
y2,
or
λR(λ) ≤ E + 
(
1− 1
α
.
)
y2. (3.8)
This generates a cut off λ∗H such that he pays back
RH(λ) =
E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2
λ
, (3.9)
whenever λ ≤ λ∗H . However, when λ > λ∗H , then even the high ability type prefers to
default.
The amount of repayment in t = 1 is observed by the citizens, as they need to pay
taxes in t = 1 to finance the repayment. Comparing between (3.7) and (3.9), we could get
RH −RL =
E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2
λ
− E + (1− )(
1
α − 1)y2
αλ
=
1
αλ
(
(α− 1)E +
(
1− 1
α
)
(α+ (1− )) y2
)
> 0.
Then the high ability leader could separate himself by paying more.
When λ < λ∗H , the high type leader can strategically repay less than RH , including
RH = 0, i.e. strategic default. In that case, the citizens would replace the leader, as they
suppose the leader is not a high type because of the deviation from RH . For λ < λ
∗
H ,
comparing between the expected utility when the high type would repay at RH and the
expected utility when the high type repay at RL, the difference can be written as(
y1 − λRH + E + y2 − q2
)
−
(
y1 − λRL +
(
1− + 
α
)
y2 − q2
)
= λRL > 0.
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Hence, the high type leader does not have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium with
repayment at RH when λ < λ
∗
H .
Under these circumstances, the low ability leader can never be re-elected. When λ <
λ∗H , the maximum repayment by the low type is RL by (3.6), which is deviated from RH .
Then citizens can update their beliefs and prefer to replace him. When λ > λ∗H , the high
type leaders always default. Then when the L type repays something, he is not re-elected.
This implies that the low type will prefer to always default, as the expected utility from
default y1 + (1 −  + α)y2 − q2 is always larger than the expected utility from repayment
y1 − αλRL + (1− + α)y2 − q2.
Then with the same argument as in the previous section, the optimal contract would
minimize the expected cost of repayment of the borrower:∫ K
1
(1− )λRH(λ)dF (λ) (3.10)
by choice of RH(λ) subject to the lender’s feasibility constraint (3.2) and the incentive
constraint (3.8) above. This suggests that it is optimal to pay as much as possible in good
states where λ is low, and as little as possible in bad states where λ is high. By incentive
compatibility constraint (3.8), the optimal contract will have the following form. There is
a cutoff point λ∗H , such that R(λ) =
E+(1− 1α)y2
λ for λ ≤ λ∗H , and R(λ) = 0 for λ > λ∗H .
With this contract, the lender’s zero-profit constraint (3.2) can be described as∫ λ∗H
1
(1− )E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2
λ
dF (λ) = q1.
or ∫ λ∗H
1
1
λ
dF (λ) =
q1
(1− ) (E +  (1− 1α) y2) . (3.11)
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This lender’s zero-profit condition determines cutoff point λ∗H . For example, if λ is
uniformly distributed on [1,K], then equation (3.11) yields λ∗H = exp
{ q1(K−1)
(1−)(E+(1− 1α)y2)
}
.
The condition for λ∗ ≥ 1 are K − 1 ≥ 0 and E > 0, given q1 > 0 and α > 1.
We summarize this results as follows.
Proposition 9 When the leader can be replaced, the optimal contract specifies R(λ) =
E+(1− 1α)y2
λ for λ ≤ λ∗H , and R(λ) = 0 for λ > λ∗H , where λ∗H is implicitly defined by
(3.11). The beliefs that support this equilibrium are that whenever they see a default for
λ < λ∗H , they believe the leader is the low ability type. Then if the leader defaults on this
contract, the citizens will replace the leader at the election in t = 1.
Proof. See Appendix. The proof follows the same logic as in the previous section.
This contract is optimal because it allows the country to repay nothing in bad states as
possible. The primary motivation is risk-sharing: it is very costly for the country to repay
in bad states. A low cut-off λ∗H means the risk-sharing is very good, because repayments
occur only in good states.
From (3.11), the country defaults more often if the need for funds (q1) is lower, and the
ego rents and the difference in ability are higher: λ∗H are increasing in q1 and decreasing
in E and α. Intuitively, again it is obvious that if the loan size q1 increases, the country
must repay more often to allow foreign lenders to break even. Thus, λ∗H increases in q1.
If E increases, his incentive to be re-elected and continue to be in office in t = 2 goes
up. Therefore, it is incentive-compatible to promise to repay more in good states as in
(3.7) and (3.9). On the other hand, given the lender’s zero profit constraint (3.11), λ∗H
would decrease as a consequence of the upward shift of repayment schedule. This makes it
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Figure 3.2: Repayment Schedule in Democracy
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possible to reduce the repayment in bad states, thus improving risk-sharing. Hence when
the value of ego rents increases, he will repay more in each good state but default more
often under the optimal contract.
If α increases, the expected utility from being replaced would decrease. Hence, the
leader’s incentive to be re-elected would increase. As in the case of increase in E, it is
incentive-compatible to promise to repay more in good states. At the same time, under
the optimal constraint (3.11), λ∗H would decrease with the improvement of the risk sharing.
3.4 Comparison
In this section, we will compare the default incentives between democracy and dictatorship.
First, we will consider the high ability leader in both cases. Comparing (3.5) and (3.11),
we find that if E+ 
(
1− 1α
)
y2 < y2− (1+r2)q2, then λ∗H > λˆ. In this case where ego rents
are small and the value of reputation to dictators is high, the dictator defaults more often,
i.e. the lenders are more likely to forgive the debt for a dictator than for a democratically
elected leader. With low ego rents, the democratic leader has a strong incentive to default
on the debt, since all he would lose from defaulting are his ego rents. To prevent the good
leader from defaulting in t = 1, the face value of repayment R(λ) for the democratic leader
becomes lower under the optimal contract along with lower E. On the other hand, with
such a low face value, the lenders need to get repayment even in worse states in order to
break even.
If E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2 > y2 − (1 + r2)q2, then λ∗H < λˆ. Thus if ego rents are large and
the value of reputation to dictators is small, the democratic leader defaults more often
and repays less in worse states, i.e. risk sharing is getting better under democracy. The
representative agent is unambiguously better off under democracy when the leader can be
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replaced, as the second period project is always implemented, in addition to better risk
sharing,
In both democracy and dictatorship, the L type leaders always default. Nonetheless,
given that the probability of having a low type leader  is sufficiently small, the probability
of default in the country on average are highly dominated by the behavior of H type
leaders, discussed the above.
3.5 Ideas for Extensions
Since this model is described in a simple way, it has potentials to be extended in many
ways to see if logics here could broadly work. First, this could be extend to a fully dynamic
model, while currently there are only two period. The reputation motive operates in all
periods except the last.
Secondly, one can allow  to be higher than in this model. This would show that when
countries have low quality leaders with high probability, then default happens more often
and risk sharing becomes worse. Also we could increase types on ability of leaders and
ultimately extend to the model with continuum of types. If there is a leader who never
repays, even the low ability leader will try to separate from him by repaying, and the
higher ability leader will try to separate from the low ability one. As a result, total default
probability would decrease.
Third, we could endogenize the saving function, which is not included in our model.
In order to save in t = 1 to consume in t = 2, we may need to assume that the initial
endowment of domestic citizens in t = 1 is enough to purchase the sovereign bonds q1.
Then representative citizen can purchase the bonds in t = 1 and receive its repayment in
t = 2 as a saving. In our model, there is only a net taxpayer in t = 1, who has incentives to
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default. If we relax the constraint, the existence of net bond-holders in t = 1, who have less
incentive to default, may lead to the decrease in the probability of default. Introduction
of the share of net taxpayers and net bondholders could give another parameter for the
probability of default.
Another derivative of this approach would be to introduce the income heterogeneity
among citizens. Given unequal initial endowments, whether the agent is a bond-holder
or not varies among them. In democracy, if the median voter theorem could be applied,
the median voter would decide whether to re-elect the leader. When the median voter is
a taxpayer in the first period, the model does not change, but when he is a bondholder,
then the median voter has his own threshold of repayment. If this threshold is higher than
before, then he will throw out anyone who does not repay frequently enough. Thus adding
the heterogeneity of incomes may lead to higher repayment than before, if the median
voter is a bondholder. When the shock is large, the median voter is likely to continue
to be a net taxpayer, and have incentives to allow default. When the shock is small, the
median is likely to be a net bondholder and so will not allow default for lower λ. This
will make the interest rate more favorable to the country. It is unlikely, however, that in
a dictatorship, this change dramatically affect the outcome of decisions, since no voting
behavior is expected.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the optimal contract in the repayment of sovereign debt
– since contract enforcement is difficult in this environment, this problem is akin to the
usual principal-agent problem with moral hazard. The optimal contract in the PA problem
takes the form of punishing the agent by firing him when the observed output is low (e.g.
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Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). In our model, under democracies, this punishment entails a
re-election where the leader can be replaced. The punishment therefore takes the form of
a loss of ego rents. On the other hand, under autocracies, no lending in the period two is
the punishment.
We compare optimal contracts for both democracies and autocracies. There is a trade
off between repayment and risk sharing. Contracts are implicitly state contingent through
the re-structuring of loans that takes place after default. We show that when ego rents
are high and value of reputation to dictators is low, then democracies have incentive to
repay more in good states and then repay less in bad states under the optimal contract.
Thus the democratic leader defaults more often than autocracies, improving risk-sharing.
Also we introduced the different type of leaders to see how the ability of leaders affect the
default decisions. The results suggest that the high ability leader defaults less often, and
repays more than the low ability leader, since default is relatively costly to him.
Our model can deliver some testable predictions on default rates for democracies or
autocracies as a function of their level of development and economic shocks. Tomz and
Wright (2007) find weaker relationship between default and bad output shocks than pre-
dicted by the theoretical literature on sovereign debt defaults. Our chapter could offer an
explanation: if the sovereign debt market is characterized by competitive lending, then
state contingent contracts can be implemented through default and partial forgiveness in
bad times. The trade-off of the contract is that if a country defaults too often, then access
to credit would be restricted. However, in democracies, default is not that costly because
leaders can be replaced. Hence default may occur even when output shocks are not that
bad.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8 The Lagrangian for the problem is written by the following
maximization:
L = −
∫ K
1
(1− )λR(λ)dF (λ) + µ
(
q1 −
∫ K
1
R(λ)dF (λ)
)
+
∫ K
1
φλ
(
R(λ)− y2 − (1 + r2)q2
λ
)
dλ (3.12)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be derived as:
∂L
∂R
= −(1− )λf(λ)− µf(λ) + φλ ≤ 0 ; R(λ) ≥ 0 (3.13)
∂L
∂µ
= q1 −
∫ L
1
R(λ)dF (λ) ≤ 0 ; µ ≥ 0 (3.14)
∂L
∂φλ
= R(λ)− y2 − (1 + r2)q2
λ
≤ 0 ; φλ ≥ 0 (3.15)
The feasibility constraint for lenders must be binding, otherwise free entry of creditors
enables R(λ) to be reduced, making the borrower better off. Then given (3.14), the solution
must satisfy µ > 0.
If both µ and φλ are positive for some λ, then R(λ) =
y2−(1+r2)q2
λ > 0 by (3.15).
If φλ = 0 for some λ and R(λ) > 0, then by (3.13), µ = −(1 − )λ < 0, which is a
contradiction. Thus if φλ = 0 for some λ, then R(λ) = 0 and −λ < µ by (3.13).
Suppose −λ1 < µ for some λ1, then this must be binding for every λ ≤ λ1. This proves
that there exists a cutoff λˆ such that the incentive constraints are binding for all λ ≤ λˆ,
and not binding for λ > λˆ.
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Proof of Proposition 9 The Lagrangian for the problem is written by the following
maximization:
L = −
∫ K
1
(1− )λR(λ)dF (λ) + µ
(
q1 −
∫ K
1
R(λ)dF (λ)
)
+
∫ K
1
φλ
(
R(λ)− E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2
λ
)
dλ (3.16)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be derived as:
∂L
∂R
= −(1− )λf(λ)− µf(λ) + φλ ≤ 0 ; R(λ) ≥ 0 (3.17)
∂L
∂µ
= q1 −
∫ L
1
R(λ)dF (λ) ≤ 0 ; µ ≥ 0 (3.18)
∂L
∂φλ
= R(λ)− E + 
(
1− 1α
)
y2
λ
≤ 0 ; φλ ≥ 0 (3.19)
The feasibility constraint for lenders must be binding, otherwise free entry of creditors
enables R(λ) to be reduced, making the borrower better off. Then given (3.18), the solution
must satisfy µ > 0.
If both µ and φλ are positive for some λ, then R(λ) =
E+(1− 1α)y2
λ > 0 by (3.19).
If φλ = 0 for some λ and R(λ) > 0, then by (3.17), µ = −(1 − )λ < 0, which is a
contradiction. Thus if φλ = 0 for some λ, then R(λ) = 0 and −λ < µ by (3.17).
Suppose −λ1 < µ for some λ1, then this must be binding for every λ ≤ λ1. This proves
that there exists a cutoff λ∗H such that the incentive constraints are binding for all λ ≤ λ∗H ,
and not binding for λ > λ∗H .
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Chapter 4
Can Democracy Reduce the Risk
of Debt Crises?
4.1 Introduction
Sovereign debt crises have been under spotlight since the global financial crisis. Most
defaults and restructuring episodes were triggered by a wide range of economic factors: (i)
a worsening of the terms of trade; (ii) an increase in international borrowing costs (e.g.,
due to tighter monetary policy in creditor countries); (iii) consistently poor macroeconomic
policies, leading to built-up of vulnerabilities such as debt-to-GDP ratio; and (iv) a crisis in
a systemic country that causes contagion across goods and financial markets (Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2006)). However, debt defaults have been observed at very different
economic levels. For instance, some countries, such as Belgium, have tolerated more than
100% of GDP of debt, while countries such as Argentina have repeatedly defaulted at much
lower levels (Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009)).
As recent case of Greece suggests, the outcomes of defaults tend to lead to significant
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challenges to the society as well as its economy. Then it is likely that political conditions
matter in the decision to enter into sovereign default. In fact, the literature on sovereign
defaults has long emphasized that the country’s willingness to pay” should be important
as well as its ability to pay”, as described in Bulow and Rogoff (1989). It has been shown
both theoretically and empirically that macroeconomic policy decisions are influenced by
political factors, such as political institutions and the timing of election. (Alesina (1997)).
Naturally there is a good body of supporting theoretical research on political and insti-
tutional factors for default decisions (Amador (2003); Tomz (2007); Cuadra and Sapriza
(2008)). However, as in Panizza et al. (2009), to date, comparatively little empirical anal-
ysis of the political economy of sovereign default has been conducted.
Compared with existing empirical literature, this chapter studies the role of political
institutions more comprehensively, using newly constructed database that maps the timing
of sovereign debt rescheduling decisions in 81 countries for 1975-2010. I analyze not only
the difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes but also a large number of
political characteristics, while controlling macro-economic variables that account for debt
dynamics. A notable innovation of this chapter is to study The Paris Club (sovereign
creditors) and The London Club (private creditors) debt reschedules separately. To my
best knowledge, the literature has ignored the difference along with the data limitation.
I empirically investigate several political economy arguments of sovereign default, in
line with the theoretical literatures: (1) how do the differences in political institutions such
as parliamentary regime or presidency affect the default decisions of countries when loans
are granted; (2) whether the degree of government concentration affects the probability of
debt crises through promoting fiscal consolidation; (3) how does political instability, in a
form of electoral competitiveness, affect the decision; (4) whether the political incentives
to continue to be in office helps ensure sovereign debts are repaid; (5) whether the outcome
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of elections has significant effects on default decisions, and (6) whether sovereign creditors
(Paris Club) give a “democratic advantage” as a foreign assistance to the country which
is democratic, on the basis of strategic and political considerations.
The chapter finds empirical support, under some conditions, for the hypothesis that
parliamentary democracies have a lower propensity to reschedule their external liabili-
ties than presidency scheme. This result is consistent with the implication of theoretical
literatures, for example Kohlscheen (2010), that the parliamentary regime has a strong
check-and-balance system on executives. It then finds that the probability of default is
lower in countries under government concentration. This finding may be seen as being in
line with a theoretical implication by Alesina and Drazen (1991) that fiscal adjustments
tend to be delayed under a divided government. I also find that the rescheduling propen-
sity of a country could be increased by the extent of political instability such as electoral
competitiveness. If the competitiveness increases, the chance to be re-elected in the next
election would be lower, which may lead to disincentives to save. Interestingly, in contrast,
the occurrence of default seems to be lower when the executive is expected to remain in
office for the next term. Finally, the result shows that the Paris Club members tend to
give more support to those borrowers who are democratic than to those who are not, while
this has not been observed in the London Club. This may correspond to a “democratic
advantage” in international community. Importantly, these results are robust to extensive
controls and to numerous specifications and estimation methods. The empirical results in
this chapter imply that the evaluation of the sustainability would be incomplete without
taking into accounts the politics of debt repayment. These findings could provide useful
implications for both academics and policy-makers who deal with the sovereign defaults
crisis.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section develops a literature
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review on political economy of sovereign debt crises, while the following section describes
a data collection. Estimation strategy of this chapter, namely panel probit model, is the
subject of section four. Analysis for the estimated results is conducted in section five.
Section six offers robustness checks, and the next section finally provides conclusions.
4.2 Literature Review
As noted by Panizza et al. (2009), although the theoretical importance of political economy
considerations to sovereign default decisions has been postulated, comparatively little em-
pirical work has been undertaken to verify or test alternative mechanisms. This is partly
because of data limitations, both in cross-country political economy data and sovereign
default data. But the work that has been done suggests that various political factors
could affect the frequency and probability of sovereign crises, i.e., reschedulings of exter-
nal debts. Among these, three aspects related to the political defaults” have attracted
particular attention.
First, characteristics of the political system could affect default decision. In theory,
democratic countries are expected to be less prone to default on their external obligations.
Democracies are more credit-worthy than autocracies, not only because of constitutional
checks and balances (and greater frequency of checks and balances, or vetoes), but also
because in democracies leaders could be easily replaced if the executives chose inefficient
choices. For instance, Dhillon and Sjostrom (2009) consider whether democracies offer
greater commitment to debt repayment than non-democracies. The results show that
democracies repay more often when the ego rents from being in office are low under the
risk sharing system, where less incentive to continue to be in office leads to the reduction
of repayment and then frequent repayment in order to keep the profits of lender. Empiri-
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cally, for instance, McGillivray and Smith (2003) compare democracies and autocracies for
default risk and fluctuations in bond prices. They find higher fluctuations in non democ-
racies. In a democracy where it is easier to remove a leader, the leader is unlikely to decide
defaults. In an absolute system where leaders are hard to be removed, the sovereign could
default without jeopardizing their tenure in office, but one would lose the market access
in return. On the other hand, Saiegh (2005) shows that democracies were more likely to
reschedule their debts than autocracies, and pay interest rates at least as high as autoc-
racies, with a sample of 62 developing countries from 1971-1997. Then empirical results
seem to be mixed.
Within the democracies, policymakers may differ in their willingness to repay the debt,
as they represent constituencies with different interests in the sovereign default. Then the
parameters on internal politics of fiscal adjustment or default decision could turn to be
relevant variables. A higher level of political constraints and many players with veto powers
can restrain the executive’s decisions. For instance, Kohlscheen (2010) argues that the
probability of default is less under a parliamentary system than a presidential system, since
the parliamentary system imposes more constraints on the executive’s behaviour. In this
regard, default is less likely under coalition governments. Saiegh (2009) shows that multi-
party coalitions tend to prevent re-distributive transfers from asset holders to tax payers
because of conflicts of interest. Given that the external default will most likely induce
a transfer among the domestic agents, coalition governments tend to avoid defaulting.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that a more polarized government tends to lead to a
game of attrition and delayed fiscal stabilization. Accordingly, a system characterized by
polarization amongst veto players could have a higher propensity to default.
Empirical studies regarding the above-mentioned theoretical implications are following.
Kohlscheen (2010) finds that the probability of default on external debt is lower in parlia-
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mentary democracies compared to presidential democracies, when there are a large number
of veto players in the government, and when the tenure of the government is long enough.
He estimates a probit model based on a sample covering 59 democracies from 1976-2003.
Saiegh (2009) shows that the probability of default on external debt is lower in coalition
governments than in single-party governments, using a sample of 48 developing countries
for 1971-1997. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) categorize regimes as democratic and
non-democratic and differentiate between defaults on external and domestic debt, using a
sample of 73 countries between 1974-2000. In democracies, a parliamentary system or suf-
ficient checks-and-balance system almost guarantees the absence of external debt default
when economic fundamentals are sufficiently strong. Curtis et al. (2012) analyze the 2011
referendum on debt repayment in Iceland. They found that citizens tend to vote for their
own interests. People with extensive investment assets and those likely suffer from higher
borrowing costs voted for repayment, while unemployed voted for default. This result
suggest that the effect of checks and balances may depend critically on the preferences of
citizens and interest groups.
Secondly, an increase in political instability may increase default risks. The more
political instability, the more political turnover an economy has. The increase in instability
also means the increase in the likelihood of the political turnover to occur. Amador (2003)
and Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) show that political uncertainty reduces the ability of a
country to save. If an incumbent party has low probability of remaining in power, the
government is unwilling to save. The party would bring resources from the future to the
present through issuing a larger debt. In this case, a higher debt level increases the default
probability, since the government would benefit more from not repaying its debt. On the
other hand, if there is more stability, the government is less eager to transfer resources to
the present. The stable government is then less likely to default. Aghion and Bolton (1990)
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study a setup in which policymakers differ in their willingness to pay. They show that the
electoral concerns induce the right-wing party to issue a larger amount of debt to affect
the election outcomes. Cole et al. (1995) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) assume the two
types of parties alternate stochastically in power. Their models suggest a type change from
impatient government to patient one may lead to making a settlement payment, since the
patient policymaker is able to siganl his type. This would explain the cycle of excluding
from the market and regaining the access.
On the empirical front, Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) use a logit model to estimate the
probability of default in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Sweden for 1960-1983. They
find that their measurement for political instability, a number of political changes in the
government in past five years, has a significant positive effect on the default probability.
The results in Brewer and Rivoli (1990) also find that political instability, the frequency of
regime change, has a significant negative effect on a country’s perceived credit ratings from
institutional investors. They use a sample of 30 countries for 1967-1986. Balkan (1992)
also uses an index of political instability, based on the amount social unrest in a given
year. The study estimates the probability of default using a sample of 31 countries from
1971-1984. A higher index increases the probability of observing a debt rescheduling in the
subsequent year. Manasse et al. (2003) find that the probability of a debt crises increases
in years with presidential elections. The sample is 37 countries for 1970-2002. Roubini
and Manasse (2005) focused on 47 emerging economies from 1970-2002. This shows that
countries with presidential elections in less than five years have a high probability of default,
when international capital markets are tight. A note though is that in these studies, the
causality between the sovereign default and turnover is unclear, as long as using annual
data. While in some cases, the government decided to default for some reasons, given the
scheduled election in the year, there must be a case where a default decision itself induced
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a turnover in the same year as a reaction to the decision.
Thirdly, the outcome of political turnover, namely elections, would affect the probability
of default, when policymakers differ in their willingness to default. In some cases, political
turnover may increase the likelihood of discontinuation of debt services. Hatchondo and
Martinez (2009) have a model where the effect of political turnover on the default probabil-
ity may depend on the type of current government. When a debtor-friendly government is
in office, the level of default risk does not depend on the probability of political turnover,
as political turnover would not trigger a political default.1 On the other hand, when a
creditor-friendly government is in office, the level of default risk would increases along
with the probability of political turnover, since political turnover could trigger a political
default.
Empirically, a political turnover seems to decrease the level of default risk. Block
and Vaaler (2004) shows that credit rating agencies downgrade developing country ratings
more often in election years, and bond spreads are higher in the 60 days before an election
compared to spreads in the 60 days after an election. This result is based on 18 presidency
elections in 19 countries for 1987-1998. More generally, Alesina (1997) discuss different
theories of electoral cycles and find evidence of policy changes in the immediate aftermath
of elections. Also turnovers of high rank government officials, regardless of elections, could
signal changes in a government’s willingness to default. Moser and Dreher (2010) find that
bond spreads increase and local currencies depreciate as a result of changes in central bank
governors, based on a sample of 20 emerging countries from 1992-2006.
1Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) even show that post-default equilibrium spreads tend to be lower than
pre-default spreads, as political turnover would actually mean good news to bondholders.
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4.3 Data
4.3.1 Dependent Variable
Data Selection
The dependent variable is a dichotomous debt crisis indicator that takes the value one
if a country rescheduled or restructured its external sovereign debt (either principal or
interest) in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Sovereign debt restructuring episodes have been
widespread around the world. I use a newly established dataset by Trebesch (2011) and
Das et al. (2013), which show 564 individual cases of reschedules in 81 countries between
1975 and 2010. Appendix 4.8.1 provides a list of countries in the sample. Out of 564
cases, 168 debt exchanges (61 countries) were with private creditors (foreign banks and
bondholders, so called “the London club”), and 396 agreements (81 countries) restructured
bilateral debt with official creditors through “the Paris Club” (government to government
debt).2 I construct the data series of Total, Paris Club, and London Club reschedule for
each country. Total get one if either Paris Club or London Club reshcedule was agreed in
the given year. The advantage of using this dataset is not only the broader coverage but
also the identification of whether the creditor is public or private (the Paris Club or the
London Club) per each rescheduling, which leads to a unique dataset to my best knowledge.
The database population is defined as all countries that experienced at least one default
in 1975-2010.3 This treatment could eliminate countries that have not been particularly
2Original dataset by Trebesch (2011) and Das et al. (2013) includes more than 600 individual cases in
95 countries for 1950-2010. Of these, 186 were debt restructurings with private creditors, and more than
450 involved restructurings with the Paris Club. I use a part of this data set because of data availability
on other variables.
3For instance, see Foley-Fisher (2012) for a similar treatment.
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active in soveregn bond markets and lending and may have depended on multilateral or
bilateral foreign assisstance in a form of donation. For those countries, political interactions
on default decision should be much less clear. In other words, inclusion of those countries
could lead to a severer bias, since some countries have not rescheduled their debts simply
because these countries were not able to borrow in the first place.4
Sovereign debt in this chapter refers to debt issued or guaranteed by the government
of a sovereign state. Although a sovereign debt restructuring has no universal definition,
following Trebesch (2011) and Das et al. (2013), I define a restructuring as an exchange
and/or haircut of outstanding sovereign debt instruments such as loans or bonds, for new
debt instruments or cash through a formal process. The database focuses on distressed
debt exchanges, defined as restructurings at less favorable terms than the original bond
or loan terms. Restructurings that are part of routine liability management aimed at
improving the profile of public debt such as debt swaps and buybacks in normal times, are
disregarded.5
Default and Restructuring
As Das et al. (2013) notes, default events and debt restructurings are closely related but
technically not identical, while the cost of debt restructuring is considered as the same
as that of default. The definition of default actually varies among the dataset. Narrow
definition of default is a violation of the legal terms of a debt contract such as a failure
4One should note that this may also exclude several developed countries, which are unlikely to be linked
to a significant default risk. Given that most of these countries are parliamentary democracies through-
out the sample period, the empirical result could have a lower default propensity under parliamentary
democracies.
5For a detailed description of the variables used in this study, see Trebesch (2011) and Das et al. (2013).
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to pay interest or principal on the due date (or within the specified grace period).6 In
most cases, debt restructuring processes are triggered by a default event as in Trebesch
(2011). Such restructurings, known as post default restructurings, can be defined as debt
exchanges that occur after a payment default, i.e., after the government has gone into
arrears on a part or all of its debt to creditors.
However, the narrow definition of default sometimes overlooks situations where the
sovereign threatens to default and creditors respond by “voluntarily” revising the contract
(Das et al. (2012)). In recent years, we have also seen a number of preemptive debt
restructurings, which can be defined as debt exchanges that occur prior to a default, that
is, without any failure of the government’s payments. For instance, recent Greece’s actions
had not triggered a narrow default: the government had not missed any payments, and
creditors had not alleged a technical breach. Nevertheless, Greece demanded new terms
and creditors consented.
While not all defaults are followed by a restructuring, it is also important to underline
that not all restructurings are preceded by a default.7 Then the event of sovereign crises
should take into account voluntary restructurings of debt.8 As in Das et al. (2012), in 2001,
all three major ratings agencies classified Argentina as a default state in November 2001
when it announced its intention to suspend payments, although the government did not
break a contract until January 2002 when it first failed to make a due payment. In order
6Defaults can be partial. For example, it is often the case that interest payments continue, while
principal payments are suspended. Yet, a default can also imply a complete halt of all debt payments
towards creditors.
7Das et al. (2012) show that of the 186 sovereign debt restructurings with foreign private creditors
between 1950 and 2010, 109 cases occurred post-default, while 77 were preemptive.
8In recognition of this problem, credit ratings agencies such as S&P define a default as beginning either
when the sovereign breaks the contract, or when the sovereign “tenders an exchange offer of new debt with
less favorable terms than the original issue” (Beers and Chambers (2006)).
86
to capture these preemptive debt restructurings, I use the event of debt restructurings as
a sovereign crisis indicator9.
Paris Club and London Club
The “Paris Club” is the main institutional framework to restructure external bilateral
sovereign debt that debtor countries owe to other governments.10 The origins of the Paris
Club date back to 1956, when Argentina met its sovereign creditors in Paris in an effort
to prevent an imminent default. With the 1980s debt crisis, the Paris Club became one of
the key vehicles to resolve debt crises around the world.
The Paris Club is an informal group of creditors and an ad-hoc negotiation forum with
no legal status and statutory rules of procedure, while it has a secretariat based in Paris.
The Paris Club members compose of the governments of 19 largest world economies, plus
additional creditor governments that are invited to participate in the negotiations on a
case-by-case basis. A country government that wants to restructure its debt would need
to approach the Club’s secretariat and demonstrate its payment difficulties and the need
for debt relief, based on its macro economic and financial situation. Debtor countries are
also required to agree with a structural adjustment program by the IMF. Once a country
satisfies these criteria, it could meet and negotiate with a group of its creditors at the Paris
Club so as to come to a bilateral agreement on broad restructuring term.
The clause foresees equal burden-sharing across all creditor groups, in particular pri-
vate creditors but also other official bilateral creditor countries that are not members of
the Paris Club. In other words, the scope of debt relief granted by the Paris Club creditors
9For instance, see Saiegh (2009) for same treatments
10This section is based on the discussions of Das et al. (2013).
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tends to determine how much debt relief other creditors should also grant to the coun-
try. As the Paris Club agreements often precede restructurings with other creditors, the
Club’s comparability of treatment rule significantly affects the negotiations with banks or
bondholders.
The process of debt renegotiations between governments and commercial banks is typ-
ically labeled as “the London Club” restructuring. The London Club is also not a statu-
tory institution based in London. The case-by-case restructuring routine was developed
between major Western banks and developing country governments in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
In the early stage of financial distress, a debtor government contacts its one or two
major bank creditors, asking them to organize and chair a steering committee. A group
of 520 representative banks establishes the Bank Advisory Committee (BAC), or Creditor
Committee, which negotiates on behalf of all banks affected by the restructuring. The
banking representatives would meet the country’s government officials on a regular basis.
These negotiations typically cover the full types of crisis resolution measures, including
the provision of new financing, short-term liquidity support, as well as the restructuring
of loans with maturity prolongation and/or reductions in face value. Once the main re-
structuring terms are agreed, “agreement in principle” is signed between the representative
BAC banks and the government. Then the terms are sent to all other banks for approval
under unanimity.
In the era of bank debt restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s, holdouts (creditors refuse
to participate in agreements arranged by a representative group) and intra-creditor disputes
were a major problem. According to data collected in Trebesch (2008), about 30 percent
of London Club restructurings suffered from intra-creditor disputes that led to delays of 3
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months or more in implementing the deal. The BAC system was introduced to overcome
coordination problems among hundreds of individual banks.
Table 4.1 could suggest that the Paris Club reschedules tend to precede the London
Club reschedules.11 The Paris Club reschedule is most likely to go along with the IMF
program, which would guarantee to recover the country’s economy and hence strengthen
the repayment capacity of the country. Thus the London Club creditors may have an
incentive to wait for the Paris Club’s decision on the reschedule and its conditionality to
minimize the losses, even if the reschedule is inevitable.
Table 4.1: The Timing of Paris Club Reschedules
Prior to London Club Posterior to London Club
6-12 months 3-6 months 0-3 months 0-3 months 3-6 months 6-12 months
26 11 22 9 5 13
59 27
On the other hand, the relation and causality between Paris club and London Club
reschedules is not statistically stylized when I conduct a Granger causality test.12 The
results of the Granger causality tests in Table 4.16 show that there is a strong evidence
that rejects the null hypothesis that the Paris Club does not cause the London Club
significantly for 21 out of 48 sample countries, while 20 countries support the London
11This excludes the cases where Paris Club reschedules took place both prior and posterior to a London
Club reschedule within one year, as this situation suggests the country was so indebted that the causality
and relationship should be unclear. Also there are some London Club reschedules which did not accompany
Paris club reschedules within a year before or after.
12See details in Appendix 4.8.2. Granger causality measures if statistically “A happens before B” rather
than “A is the cause of B”.
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Club led hypothesis. Considering strong empirical support for two-way Granger causality
between the Paris Club and the London Club reschedules in 10 countries, overall this study
does not provide strong evidence supporting the view that the Paris Club reschedule is an
important determinant of the London Club reschedule. This study also highlights that the
causality differs across countries. Possible reasons for the mixed results are differences in
debt structure and the degree of market access among countries.
Taking advantage of the property of dataset I use, there is a hypothesis for empirical
investigation: Exogenous sources of a “democratic advantage”(Saiegh (2005)) could be
observed. In principle, lenders should be motivated by economic objectives. However, as
in Schultz and Weingast (2003), this is certainly true for private lending, while the role of
foreign assistance, in the form of grants and loans that richer countries and/or international
financial institutions (IFIs) would give to poorer countries, is also an important aspect
for the discussion. As Drazen (2001) notes, foreign assistance is sometimes given for
non-economic reasons, based on strategic and/or geopolitical considerations of the donor
country and organization. Hence, if sovereign lenders, the Paris Club members in this case,
are willing to give more support to those borrowers who are democratic than to those who
are not, then we may observe a “democratic advantage”, where the public lender is likely
to allow the democratic sovereign borrower to reschedule its debt.
4.3.2 Political Variables
This chapter uses a large number of political variables. Main data source is the Data of
Political Institutions (DPI) by The World Bank, but I also supplement with data from other
sources. Political institutional variables are divided into two parts. As we aimed to avoid
endogeneity bias, we used lagged variables whenever practicable. Structural variables such
as degree of democracy are less likely to be immediately affected by the default decision,
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while event variables such as election could be impacted by default decesion.13 Detailed
discussions are followed in each section.
Political System
In order to check if parliamentary systems have fewer reschedulings as in the previous stud-
ies, I use a Parliamentary parameter, which distinguishes parliamentary from presidential
and mixed systems. If the country has a parliamentary form of government, the variable
equals two.14 If it has an assembly-elected presidency, the variables is going to be one.
Systems with presidents, who are elected directly, or unelected executives get a zero. A
parliamentary system or sufficient checks and balance systems are expected to restrain the
executive and lead to fewer defaults. Then its coefficient is expected to be negative.
The developments of democracy may lead to a “democratic advantage”(Saiegh (2005)),
especially for the Paris Club reschedulings. To observe this correlation, I use Democracy
indicators defined by POLITY project. The variable is originally an additive scale (0-
10), derived from codings of the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment,
constraints on the chief executive, and the competitiveness of political participation.15 I
presume to see the difference between the Paris Club and the London Club, as the public
lenders such as the Paris Club member are expected to be more likely to allow the demo-
cratic sovereign borrowers to reschedule its debt, to give more support to those borrowers
who are democratic, compared with the private lenders who would try to maximize their
13Periods of revolution or wartime where drastic changes in any variables are expected are excluded from
observations.
14To compare the impacts with other variables directly, in estimation, I use the rescaled index, normalized
between 0 and 1. See Table 4.2.
15To compare the impacts with other variables directly, in estimation, I use the rescaled index, normalized
between 0 and 1. See Table 4.2.
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profits.16
As Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggests, a divided government may lead to a game of
attrition and delayed fiscal stabilization along with a higher propensity to default, as it
would take a longer time to reach an agreement on the allocation of the cost of stabilization.
To measure a government’s partisan concentration, I use a Government Concentration
parameter, which is Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index of concentration. This variable is
computed as
HH =
∑
i
p2i ,
where pi = si/S, si is the number of seats of party i, and S is the total number of seats
held by the government. This indicators reaches its maximum value one under single-
party governments. The minimum zero is approached when all parties included in the
government have equal numbers of seats and the number of parties increases. Therefore,
it is expected to have a negative sign.
Political Instability and Turnover
As in Amador (2003), political uncertainty reduces the ability of a country to save, and
increase default risks, because an incumbent executive with lower probability of remaining
in power is unwilling to save. To examine this, I use the Electoral Competitiveness for
Executive index, which originally varies between 1 and 7; 1 if no legislature, 2 if acclamation
on unelected executives , 3 if executives are elected from one party, 4 if elected from multiple
16Apparently the development of democracy could be an indicator for a good business envirionment
through transparency and accountability framework. Then the private lenders would prefer the higher
score of the indicator, although they wouldn’t allow the borrowers to reschedule the debt in any setting to
maximize their profits.
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candidates within one party, 5 if elected under the situation where multiple parties are legal
but only one party won seats, 6 if the largest party received more than 75% of the seats, or
7 if the largest party received less than 75% of the seats.17 This suggests that competitively
elected prime ministers get 6 or 7. If the index is higher, the likelihood of political changes
would increase, implying a higher political instability. Hence its coefficient is expected to
be positive.
A binary index of Re-Elected is used to check if the increase in the probability of a
leader to be re-elected would lead to a lower default probability. Executives get 1 if he
can be re-elected following the current term, when the executive’s term is constitutionally
limited. If a term limit is not explicitly stated, 1 is also recoded. As a lame duck leader
may have less incentive to save and then have a higher probability to default, the sign is
expected to be negative.
To see the effect of political turnover on the default probability, I use an Election index,
which takes 1 if there was an executive election in the previous year. Notice that there
is concern on causality in the relationship between sovereign defaults and election. An
election would affect the probability of posterior default in the given year, while a default
decision itself could induce an election in the same year. Considering that the dataset I use
is annual, this variable is lagged for one year to focus on the effect of turnover, dealing with
its potential endogeneity. Since the effect of political turnover on the default probability
may depend on the type of current government, the sign of its coefficient is uncertain.
17To compare the impacts with other variables directly, in estimation, I use the rescaled index, normalized
between 0 and 1. See Table 4.2.
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4.3.3 Control Variables
As discussed in the previous section, countries are sometimes unable to repay their debt
regardless of their willingness to pay, when they are insolvent or illiquid. Thus a number
of macroeconomic variables could affect the likelihood of sovereign debt default. I use the
following explanatory variables as economic control variables, which are included in the
core specifications. These have been used in previous studies on debt default. The main
data source is the World Bank’s Development Indicators, while some of them are obtained
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. All variables are rescaled to ratios, not
in percent figures (See Table 4.2).
In most theoretical models of sovereign default, the level of debt, Debt to GDP Ratio,
plays an importnat role. Whether a country is solvent or not depends on its debt relative
to its ability to pay. This variable captures the degree of solvency of a country. Therefore,
it is expected to have a positive sign.
Debt Services to Exports Ratio measures possible liquidity problems. A debt crisis can
also occur if a country is illiquid rather than insolvent. Higher debt service ratios has an
adverse effect on a country’s ability to repay its debt. Thus its coefficient is expected to
be positive.
International Reserves to Total Debt Ratio measures the level of international liquidity
held by a country. In contrast to the previous variable, the lower the international reserves
to debt ratio, the greater there might be a threat of having a sudden liquidity crisis. Then
it is expected that the coefficient on this variable is negative.
Real GDP Growth Ratio is used to measure the impact of economic shock. It has
been argued that a decline in the growth rate could contribute to a long-term insolvency
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problem, leading to higher default probabilities. On the other hand, a decline in growth
may mitigate an external liquidity constraint through lower imports, and can lead to a
lower probability of a sovereign default; therefore, the impact of this variable on default is
uncertain.18 Also the direction of causality in the relationship between sovereign defaults
and growth could be argued. While some of studies, e.g. Kohlscheen (2010), suggest a
robust association between debt defaults and low growth, they only indicate a correlation
between the two variables. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) show that debt defaults are
usually a consequence of some economic shocks that also hurt growth at the same time.
Therefore, in this chapter, the series of this variable used in estimates are lagged to make
sure the causality can be maintained.
Short-Term Debt to Total Debt Ratio is considered to link with crises through rollover
capacity. Assume that a debtor country needs to service a large amount of due obligations.
If creditors can not roll over some or all of the maturing debt, default is the optimal choice.
If the loan could be rolled over, the debtor country is better off repaying. This variable thus
captures whether countries are able to borrow short-term funds in international market to
avoid a rescheduling of their sovereign debt. Then it should be negatively correlated to
rescheduling probability.
As Palac-McMiken (1995) notes, the literatures include at least 13 different model
specifications for sovereign default and economic variables, while no representative model
exists in the literatures. A number of alternative explanatory variables were tested, namely
central government budget surplus and current account surplus.19 None of these variables
18Tomz and Wright (2007) find that 38 percent of 169 sovereign default episodes in their sample occurred
in years when the output level in the defaulting country was above the trend value.
19A demographical change could be a proxy for controlling the social security spending in the country,
which is expected to increase rapidly when the population is aging. The increase in the social security
spending tends to limit the flexibility of fiscal managment and then would lead to defaulting in theory.
95
has the expected sign and a p-value below 0.10 when added to the baseline specification.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
In order to examine the interaction between the probability of sovereign crises to happen
and political variables, this section builds the estimation strategy for panel probit model
mainly based on Greene (2003), using the data set described in the previous section. The
baseline specification takes 81 countries data with an average time span of 25 years.
When analyzing binary responses in the context of panel data, it is often useful to
begin with a linear model. However, a linear probability model for binary outcomes has
a problem as the predicted values for the dependent variables cannot be ensured to lie
between zero and one, depending on the estimated coefficients of independent variables.
Then we use a probit model to illustrate partial likelihood methods with panel data.
The model can be described as
y∗it = xitβ + ci + eit, t = 0, ..., T
yit = 1 [y
∗
it > 0], (4.1)
and
Pr(yit = 1|xit, ci) = Φ(xitβ + ci), (4.2)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution,
taking on values in the unit interval; yit is the binary indicator of debt crises in terms of
rescheduling episodes, each corresponding to country i at time t; xit denotes a vector of
determinants of default; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and ci denotes the
However, it is difficult to conduct the specification due to data limitation.
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unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. xit can contain a variety of factors, including
time dummies, interactions of time dummies with time-consistent or time-varying variables,
and lagged dependent variables.
The most restrictive approach assumes to take all the cross period correlation away
and treats the panel essentially as a cross section. This produces the “pooled” estimator
which is the standard, single equation probit model. The model could be written as
Pr(yit = 1|xit) = Φ(xitβ), t = 0, ..., T (4.3)
where y∗it = xitβ+ci+eit = xitβ+δ+eit. ci contains only a constant term δ. Then ordinary
least squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of the slope vector β. The focus of
this study is on the incidence of rescheduling episodes rather than their precise timing, and
on the persisitence of political factors after controlling for liquidity and solvency variables.
Given this purpose, in this chapter, I use a simple pooled probit regression as a baseline
model20.
Another popular model for binary outcomes is a fixed effects probit model. The main
assumption of this model is
Pr(yit = 1|xi, ci) = Pr(yit = 1|xit, ci) = Φ(xitβ + ci), t = 0, ..., T (4.4)
where individual specific effect ci is unobserved but correlated with xit, and xi contains
xit for all t. This means that xit is strictly exogenous conditional on ci. Also a standard
assumption is that the outcomes, yit, are independent conditional on (xi, ci). Then the yit
are dependent across t conditional only on the observables, xi. As this embodies all the
observable effects and specifies an estimable conditional mean, the fixed effect approach
20See Kraay and Nehru (2006) and Kohlscheen (2010) for a similar treatment
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takes ci to be a group-specific constant term. Without restricting the relationship between
ci and the xi, this model treats the ci as parameters to be estimated along with β, as
this treatment obviates the need to make assumptions about the distribution of ci given
xit. However, estimation of ci along with β introduces an incidental parameters problem
stated by Neyman and Scott (1948). When the number of time periods, T, is small and
the number of individuals, N, is large (N → ∞ for a fixed T ), the number of parameters
ci increases with N unlike in the linear case. Then ci cannot be consistently estimated for
a fixed T . Thus the maximum likelihood estimator of β is biased and inconsistent as a
consequence of an omitted variable. Several estimators have been proposed to tackle this
inconsistency problem due to the lack of independence between ci and xi. The estimator
proposed by Chamberlain (1984) to circumvent this problem appears to require a very
large N, such as individual micro dataset, in order to yield satisfactory results (see Lechner
and Breitung (1996) for details). Then as for panel data, fixed effects probit models tend
not to be taken into accounts. Also note that fixed effect may not be included in this case,
as the stringent conditions for a full-fledged unobserved effects probit analysis are not met.
The unobserved effects probit model has been also popular for the random effects
model. The random effects model analyzed by Butler and Moffitt (1982) maintains the
homoscedasticity (unit variances) assumption but extends the pooled model by allowing
cross period correlation.21 This random effect approach specifies that ci is a group-specific
random element, similar to eit. This is a linear regression model with a compound dis-
turbance that can be consistently estimated by least squares. The traditional random
effects probit model assumes that the ci and xit are uncorrelated, and that ci has a normal
21The difference from the fixed effect is whether the unobserved individual effects are correlated with the
regressors in the model.
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distribution:
ci|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2c ) (4.5)
In section 6, I will estimate random-effects probit models as a robustness check.
Bertschek and Lechner (1998) proposed GMM estimators for the probit model based
on panel data, while this estimator needs strict exogeneity. While strict exogeneity would
be plausible to be met for some institutional variables, this would be very difficult to hold
for the ratio variables. A debt rescheduling, for instance, may have a direct impact on the
ratio variables in the following periods.
Dynamic models which contain unobserved effects are also important in assessing poli-
cies. A random effect model that explicitly allows for lagged dependent variable approach
is called the dynamic random effects probit model, defined as
Pr(yit = 1|yi,t−1, ..., yi0,xit, ci) = G(xitβ + ρyi,t−1 + ci), t = 1, ..., T (4.6)
where G can be the probit function. Again, the hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 is of interest. The
larger the value of ρ, the greater the degree of state dependence in default probabilities.
These models, however, suffer from the well-known initial conditions problem; how we
treat the initial value of the dependent variable yi0, in terms of whether yi0 is independent
of ci. Most studies assume that each yi0 is non-stochastic for each i or exogenous. This
implies a very strong assumption that ci and yi0 are independent. When a correlation is in-
duced between them, ignoring this problem will result in biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates.
There are several approaches to handling endogenous initial conditions, of which the
most popular one is proposed by Heckman (1981a,b). He approximates the reduced form
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linear equation for the initial observation such as yi0 = λ
′zi + ηi, where zi is a vector of
strictly exogenous instruments, and maximum likelihood estimation using the full set of
sample observations. Orme (1997, 2001) suggest a two-step procedure for corrections for
sample selection, in which ci is substituted with another unobservable component uncorre-
lated with the initial observation. Wooldridge (2005) suggests an alternative Conditional
Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator that models the distribution of the full observed
y1, y2, ...yT conditional on the value of the initial period yi0 and exogenous variables. Aru-
lampalam and Stewart (2009) compare results obtained using these three estimation meth-
ods and show that all yield similar results, and that none of the three dominates the other
two.
In section 6, I estimate the dynamic random effects model to see the persistence
of the events as a robustness check. Among others, I use the Wooldridge estimator in
this chapter.22 Following Wooldridge (2005), the joint density for the observed sequence
(y1, y2, ...yT |y0) is written as f(y1, y2, ...yT |y0,x, ci). In order to integrate out the unob-
servable ci, Wooldridge specifies an approximation for the density of ci conditional on the
initial observation y0, via the auxiliary model such as
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + x
+
i
′
α2 + ai, (4.7)
where x+i is the row vector of all explanatory variables in all time periods such as (x
′
i1, ....,x
′
iT )
′
,
including variables that are correlated with the unobservable ci. Henceforth, ai is normal
with mean 0 and variance σ2a, given the regressors in the model. The idea is that the
correlation between yi0 and ci is handled by the use of (4.7), giving another unobserv-
able individual-specific error term ai, which is uncorrelated with the initial observation y0.
22This is mainly computational purpose. Capellari and Jenkins (2008) and Arulampalam and Stewart
(2009) suggest an estimation of Heckman indicators is considerably more expensive in terms of computing
time than the others.
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Then the dynamic equation to be estimated becomes,
y∗it = xitβ + ρyi,t−1 + α0 + α1yi0 + x
+
i
′
α2 + ai + eit t = 1, ..., T. (4.8)
In this model, the contribution to the likelihood function for individual i is given by
Li =
∫ { T∏
t=1
G[(xitβ + ρyi,t−1 + α0 + α1yi0 + x+i
′
α2 + a)(2yit − 1)]
}
g∗(a)da, (4.9)
where g∗(a) is the normal probability density function of the new unobservable heterogene-
ity ai, given in (4.7). Since (4.9) has the exactly the same structure as in the standard
random effects probit model likelihood contribution, we can proceed with the maximiza-
tion using standard software. According to literatures such as Akay (2012), x+i could be
replaced by x¯i =
1
T
∑T
t=0 xit, which are within-means of the time varying covariates across
all periods.23
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Summery Statistics
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the country-year observations of our es-
timation. Based on the original dataset by Trebesch (2011) and Das et al. (2013), the
observations, which don’t include all economic variables in the given year due to data
availability, are excluded from the sample. As a result, the sample consists of 2200 individ-
ual observations on 81 countries between 1975 and 2010 period, including 417 reschedule
episodes. Of these, 137 debt exchanges (53 countries) were with private creditors (“the
23Wooldridge (2005) proposed the model with either xi or x¯i, which includes time-constant covariates.
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) suggests that the constrained model with x¯i, including the initial period,
may lead to a bias if the data is a short panel, e.g. T = 5, and instead x¯i
+ = 1
T−1
∑T
t=1 xit, which does
not include the initial-period explanatory variables, can be used.
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London club”), and 330 agreements (71 countries) restructured bilateral debt with official
creditors through “the Paris Club”. (government to government debt).
The unconditional probability of the Paris Club rescheduling in any given year during
the sample period was 15 percent, compared with 6.2 percent for the London Club resched-
ules. These figures can imply that the London Club allow to reschedule their debts less
often than the Paris Club. I use a t-test to examine differences in average debt rescheduling
under the Paris Club and the London Club systems. The results of t-test (t = −10.9708
and p < 0.0001) reject the null hypothesis that the difference in means of the Paris Club
and the London Club reschedules is zero.
4.5.2 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 – 4.5 report the core specifications; Total, the Paris Club and the London Club
reschedulings. The second column presents the results of the model without the politi-
cal variables. The third column and beyond report the specifications with the political
variables, controlling the economic variables.
Among these, column II shows that parliamentary systems have a negative effect on
sovereign debt defaults relative to presidency as in the previous studies, while the effect
was not statistically significant in some cases. This result is consistent with the theoret-
ical predictions that a parliamentary system or sufficient checks and balance systems are
expected to restrain the executive and lead to fewer defaults. Robustness checks support
this results with statistical significance.
Next, the Democarcy variable has the positive coefficients for total reschedules and the
Paris Club reschedules but not for London Club. This suggests that for the Paris Club
lenders, the probability of allowing the reschedule increases significantly if the borrower
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Table 4.2: Summery Statistics for Country-year Observations
Obs Means Std. dev. Min Max
Debt reschedule
All 2200 0.190 0.392 0 1
Paris Club 2200 0.150 0.357 0 1
London Club 2200 0.062 0.242 0 1
Debt to GDP 2200 0.801 0.855 0.026 12.524
Debt Service to Export 2200 0.199 0.156 0.003 1.569
Reserves to Total Debt 2200 0.288 1.026 -0.002 23.847
Growth Rate (t-1) 2200 0.034 0.054 -0.502 0.352
Short-Term to Total Debt 2200 0.128 0.102 0 0.817
Parliamentary 2188 0.171 0.337 0 1
Democracy 2147 0.902 0.177 0 1
Government Concentration 1906 0.830 0.270 0 1
Electoral Competitiveness 2196 0.715 0.356 0 1
Re-elected 1705 0.760 0.427 0 1
Election (t-1) 2200 0.140 0.347 0 1
Notes: All economic variables are ratios, not in percentage figures.
Political variables are rescaled between 0 and 1.
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countries are democratic, while there is not a case for the London Club lenders. This results
support the “democratic advantage” discussed in section 3 – the Paris Club members are
more likely to allow the democratic sovereign borrower to reschedule its debt than to
those who are not, in a form of foreign assistance. Also one could argue that this type of
“democratic advantages” may be applied to the private lenders in a sense that the level
of democracy of the country could be a key determinant on their investment decisions,
even based on profit-driven motives. However, the result suggests that the “democratic
advantage” on sovereign debt restructuring is unlikely to be given by private lenders, as
the restructure would directly lead to causing a loss to lenders.
The results of Column IV show that the higher the government’s partisan concentration,
the smaller is the probability of a debt crisis. These empirical results remain strong both
in statistical and substantive term. As Alesina and Drazen (1991) implies, a fictionalized
government tends to have delayed fiscal reforms, which would lead to a higher propensity
of default, because such governments are likely to suffer from a war of attrition over the
allocation of the cost of stabilization. As an analogy of this argument, one can consider that
if the degree of the government concentration is higher, the decisions on fiscal adjustment
would be reached faster due to relatively less conflicts over the allocation of the cost. In
this sense, a debt crisis is likely to be avoided under the concentrated government. This
result may be controversial, as some previous studies such as Saiegh (2009) suggest that the
coalition government is likely to have fewer defaults to avoid conflicts over re-distributive
transfer from asset holders to tax payers when defaulting. Again theoretically speaking, a
single or concentrated government is more likely to have less conflict within the government
because of less number of veto players. This characteristic would enable to achieve faster
fiscal consolidation but also provide less incentive to avoid re-distributive transfers, which
would be induced by the default. The estimation result could imply that the positive effect
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of promoting fiscal reforms exceeds the negative effect of political disincentive of avoiding
default.
Also the effect of competitive electoral environments on the probability to default is
robust as in the column V. When the competitiveness for being re-elected is getting tighter,
the probability of debt reschedulings increases. This implies that if the likelihood of being
in office in the next term decreases, the leader has less incentive to save. More broadly,
the difficulty to be re-elected in the next term can be considered as a proxy for political
instability. Then the results could support a theoretical implication that more the political
instability, more the debt rescheduling would occur.
In the column VI, I report the results obtained when the Re-Elected variables is included
in the estimation. When the leader can be re-elected following the current tenure, the
probability of defaulting decreases significantly. In some cases, default decisions may lead
to punishments in a form of replacing the executives. This suggests that when the leader
can be re-elected, he could continue to enjoy ego rents from being office, and has a strong
incentive to avoid defaults, otherwise the leader would try to get the ego rent within the
current term as much as possible by increasing spending.
Column VII suggests that whether an election took place in the previous year is not
likely to affect the probability of default in a given year significantly. This result is con-
sistent with theoretical implications by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), i.e. the effect of
political turnover on the default probability may depend on the type of incumbent gov-
ernment. When a debtor-friendly government was in office, the political turnover would
not trigger a political default. On the other hand, incumbent government was a creditor-
friendly and lost the election, the probability of default should increase. In this regard, the
election outcome, e.g. a shift from center-left to right-wing government, could be taken
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into account for the future research.
The estimated coefficients for the economic variables are statistically significant in most
cases, and consistent with the aforementioned projected signs. The coefficient for the debt
to GDP ratio is positive and statistically significant in most cases, suggesting that a higher
level of indebtedness is associated with a higher probability of debt rescheduling. In terms
of debt services to exports ratio, the probability of debt reschedulings increases as liquidity
problems are more acute with a higher debt services to exports ratio. On the contrary, the
coefficients of reserve ratio show a negative sign as expected. The lower the international
reserves to debt ratio, the greater there might be a threat of facing a sudden liquidity crisis.
Short-term debt has the expected effects. As financial conditions become worse, countries
may seek the acquisition of short-term debt to cover liquidity problems. In other words,
the ability of borrowing short-term loans decreases the probability of debt rescheduling.
While the effect of growth rate is statistically indistinguishable from zero in some cases,
the signs are mostly negative, implying that a lower growth is associated with a higher
default probability through deteriorating its insolvency.
Comparing between Table 4.4 and 4.5, the London Club reschedulings seem to be
less affected by these variables, as the coefficient of several economic variables and most
political variables are statistically insignificant, compared with the case of the Paris Club.
Especially, for the London Club reschedule, the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio and short-term
debt is not statistically significant, in contrast to the Paris Club reschedule. As discussed
in Section 3, this is partly because the rescheduling negotiations under the London Club
tend to be precluded by the discussion in the Paris Club. Although both institutions
are independent in principle, in some cases, the private creditors may follow the decisions
by the public lenders, including the international financial institutions, regardless of the
nature of the country.
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A more substantive understanding of this relationship could be obtained by observing
Table 4.3. Having a leader with possiblity to be in the office for the next term diminishes
the probability of debt reschedules by 25%. When the degree of government concentration
increases by 10%, the default probability would decrease by 4%.24 Also coefficient of
economic variables suggest that when debt-to-GDP ratio increases by 10%, then the default
possiblity would increase by more or less 1%. On the other hand, if reserves to total debt
ratio increases by 10%, then the probability of debt reschedules would decrease by 14%.
To place ths percentage in context, we recall that the unconditional probability of debt
reschedules for the Paris Club is 15% in the sample.
4.6 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Alternative Estimation Model
While a pooled cross-sectional time-series sample is used as a baseline estimation, this may
raise concerns regarding time and country effects, i.e. a pooled probit model ignores the
cross-correlation. In particular, if the observations are temporally dependent, the results
of a pooled probit analysis may be misleading. I retain the basic specification, but explore
sensitivity by estimating the random-effects model, which allows individual-specific effects
in the equation as discussed in section 4.
Table 4.6 – 4.8 present the estimation results when a random effect panel probit model
was used in the estimation. By and large, the results obtained in the random effects
probit model confirm our previous findings. For instance, the probability of London Club
24Other political variables are ranked by a relatively subjective scale, which would not be suitable for
analyzing quantatively.
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Table 4.3: Baseline Model: Total Reschedules
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: All debt reschedules
Estimated model: Pooled Probit
Real Growth (t-1) -0.842 -0.977 -0.980 -0.867 -0.911 -1.341* -0.837
(1.43) (1.58) (1.64) (1.31) (1.53) (1.77) (1.42)
Debt to GDP 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.105*** 0.145*** 0.109***
(2.89) (2.86) (2.89) (2.67) (2.78) (2.89) (2.89)
Short term debt to total debt -2.637*** -2.612*** -2.708*** -2.545*** -2.672*** -3.178*** -2.639***
(6.67) (6.58) (6.77) (6.07) (6.72) (6.63) (6.68)
Reserves to total debt -1.367*** -1.350*** -1.391*** -1.488*** -1.457*** -1.398*** -1.364***
(6.14) (6.09) (6.24) (6.32) (6.32) (5.55) (6.14)
Debt service to exports 0.777*** 0.771*** 0.746*** 0.585*** 0.836*** 0.586** 0.778***
(3.74) (3.71) (3.56) (2.62) (3.98) (2.33) (3.75)
Parliamentary -0.137
(1.33)
Democracy 0.468**
(2.34)
Government Concentration -0.383***
(3.01)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.247**
(2.36)
Re-elected -0.252***
(2.68)
Election (t-1) 0.021
(0.22)
Constant -0.568*** -0.544*** -0.956*** -0.172 -0.714*** -0.276** -0.571***
(6.19) (5.85) (4.79) (1.15) (6.45) (2.00) (6.15)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.103 0.091
Log likelihood -961.77 -955.03 -945.50 -839.51 -957.00 -727.65 -961.75
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.4: Baseline Model: Paris Club
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: Paris Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Pooled Probit
Real growth (t-1) -0.882 -1.035 -1.059* -1.405** -0.958 -1.205 -0.865
(1.42) (1.58) (1.67) (2.02) (1.52) (1.50) (1.39)
Debt to GDP 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.133*** 0.170*** 0.137***
(3.58) (3.55) (3.56) (3.30) (3.47) (3.39) (3.59)
Short term debt to total debt -3.000*** -2.950*** -3.124*** -2.774*** -3.025*** -3.097*** -3.010***
(6.95) (6.81) (7.13) (6.12) (6.97) (6.13) (6.96)
Reserves to total debt -1.265*** -1.246*** -1.282*** -1.357*** -1.348*** -1.333*** -1.265***
(5.404) (5.34) (5.46) (5.48) (5.56) (5.03) (5.40)
Debt service to exports 0.482** 0.476** 0.493** 0.374 0.535** 0.292 0.486**
(2.22) (2.19) (2.25) (1.61) (2.44) (1.10) (2.23)
Parliamentary -0.189*
(1.70)
Democracy 0.546**
(2.49)
Government Concentration -0.355***
(2.65)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.306**
(2.06)
Re-elected -0.131
(1.33)
Election (t-1) 0.088
(0.89)
Constant -0.663*** -0.635*** -1.125*** -0.312** -0.799*** -0.503*** -0.676***
(6.96) (6.58) (5.15) (2.01) (6.91) (3.48) (7.00)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.091 0.093 0.095 0.091 0.096 0.089
Log likelihood -847.26 -840.04 -833.75 -742.11 -843.06 -645.64 -846.86
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.5: Baseline Model: London Club
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: London Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Pooled Probit
Real growth (t-1) -0.977 -1.074 -1.021 -0.585 -1.027 -1.699* -0.986
(1.24) (1.30) (1.28) (0.66) (1.28) (1.66) (1.25)
Debt to GDP -0.057 -0.058 -0.056 -0.085 -0.064 -0.050 -0.057
(0.98) (0.99) (0.96) (1.26) (1.10) (0.70) (0.98)
Short term debt to total debt -0.807 -0.857 -0.795 -0.925 -0.873 -1.967*** -0.803
(1.52) (1.61) (1.48) (1.61) (1.63) (2.76) (1.51)
Reserves to total debt -1.463*** -1.475*** -1.504*** -1.592*** -1.619*** -1.409*** -1.461***
(4.06) (4.08) (4.14) (4.19) (4.28) (3.48) (4.06)
Debt service to exports 1.210*** 1.209*** 1.174*** 1.032*** 1.264*** 1.143*** 1.209***
(4.80) (4.78) (4.56) (3.76) (4.97) (3.66) (4.79)
Parliamentary 0.129
(0.99)
Democracy 0.322
(1.19)
Government Concentration -0.241
(1.42)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.261**
(2.03)
Re-elected -0.435***
(3.66)
Election (t-1) -0.042
(0.32)
Constant -1.392*** -1.400*** -1.664*** -1.086*** -1.549*** -0.926*** -1.387***
(11.02) (10.88) (6.19) (5.34) (10.33) (4.95) (10.89)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.074 0.072 0.070 0.076 0.098 0.073
Log likelihood -475.83 -474.51 -468.09 -416.44 -473.60 -348.28 -475.78
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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reschedules are less associated with the economic and political variables than that of Paris
Club reschedule. The noticeable difference from the results, however, is that in random
effects model, the ratio of short term debt to total debt is associated with the probability
of reschedule in all specifications, while no statistical significance of short-term debt with
London Club reschedules is observed in baseline model. This proves that controlling the
heterogeneity, the ability to roll over through the short-term debt to deal with liquidity
problems decreases the probability of reschedule in the case of London Club.
4.6.2 Dynamic Model
Table 4.9 reports the results of dynamic random effects models with Wooldridge estimators.
This allows for different processes based on the lagged value of dependent variable to
examine the persistence of the debt reschedule (See details in section 4). In most of
specifications, the coefficients of ρ in equation (4.6) are positive with statistical significance.
This suggests that the debt reschedule in the previous year increases the probability of
having a reschedule in the given year with greater state dependence. Also the results of
other estimates are broadly consistent with those in baseline estimations, but there are
some differences. For example, debt-to-GDP ratio is not associated with the probability
of debt reschedule. Under such a ‘transition’ model, the debt stock has less impact on the
decision on reschedule.
Table 4.10 shows the empirical illustration on different estimators for dynamic probit
models of core specification. Column I gives the pooled probit estimates. Column II
provides the equivalent standard random effects probit estimates, treating lagged debt
reschedule as exogenous. The corresponding Wooldridge CML estimates, which allows for
the endogeneity of the initial conditions, are given in column III (same as in Table 4.9).
The coefficients on yt−1 are significantly positive in all cases, implying that debt reschedule
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at t − 1 increases the probability of having a reschedule at t, although the magnitude of
coefficients looks different.
Using random effects model results in a considerable reduction in the estimate of γ
compared to the pooled estimates, and Wooldridge estimators have led to a further decline.
As the random effects probit model and Wooldridge estimators use different normalization
from the pooled probit models, to compare coefficients, rescaling them are needed by
multiplying by an estimate of
√
1− ρ. 25 The rescaled coefficient estimates at t − 1 are
0.170 for random effects model, and 0.150 for Wooldridge model, respectively, which means
a reduction by almost half of the pooled probit estimate. These results of biased estimates
are consistent with the empirical results shown in Arulampalam and Stewart (2009).
4.6.3 Democracies
As some of political variables are designed for democracies, non-democratic regimes could
be excluded from our sample to see the political effects closely. I use POLITY score
to exclude the non-democratic regimes.26 A country is considered as a democracy if its
POLITY score is between +6 to +10 in a given year.27 Country-year observations that do
not meet this condition are eliminated.
The empirical results on democratic countries are reported in Table 4.11. While broadly
the pattern of the results does not change, the main difference is that the parliamentary
regime variable has a statistically significant coefficient. This suggests the rejection of the
25ρ is the constant cross-period error correlation given by ρ = σ2α/(σ
2
α+1). See Arulampalam and Stewart
(2009) for details.
26The POLITY dataset doesn’t cover Belize and Grenada, and some countries for 1975-1990 (Bosnia,
Georgia, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan Republic, Moldova, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Ukraine).
27See Polity IV Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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hypothesis of no effects on the form on government on the rescheduling propensity, as in
the previous studies. Also the estimates for debt-to-GDP ratio and debt service ratio don’t
have statistical significance. This may suggest that democratic countries is likely to decide
the default decision based on the “willingness to pay” rather than the “ability to pay”.
The Democracy and Electoral Competitiveness indicators lose the statistical significance,
because the dataset used in the estimates only includes democratic countries.
4.6.4 Large T Samples
Due to data availability, year coverage varies across countries. This may raise the concern
that the results could be affected by the fact that some countries are sampled more often
than others, and that short period panels lead to a bias. To deal with this issue, I separate
the sample countries into two subgroups, depending on the size of the year observations.
The renewed dataset keeps those countries with 20 or more year-observations (59 countries),
and those countries with less than 20 (22 countries) are eliminated.
Table 4.12 presents the results of the split sample analysis. While this reduces the
sample size, irrespective of these sample size, the effect of political and economic variables
remains robust and statistically significant. Reassuringly, the estimates from columns
I-VI are broadly consistent with those from Table 4.3 discussed earlier. Most obvious
difference is that the coefficients of growth ratio and parliamentary index have statistically
significant signs in Table 4.12. This suggests the rejection of the hypothesis that the form
on government has no effects on the rescheduling propensity. In this sense, parliamentary
democracies are less prone to reschedule than the presidential system, as the previous
studies show. Also theoretical literatures suggest that the sign of the coefficient of growth
could be mixed, but this result provides empirical evidence that a lower growth is associated
with a higher probability of debt crises.
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4.6.5 Augmented specification
Table 4.13 presents a model in which all political variables are included to analyze com-
peting hypotheses from the theoretical literature. The results demonstrate that by and
large the effect of political and economic variables under this setting is consistent with the
outcome in the previous studies. In particular, this finds that the probability of default is
lower in countries under government concentration and with leaders who have a chance to
continue to be in office for the next term. The idea of “democratic advantage” in interna-
tional community is also supported only for the Paris Club lenders in this exercise. On the
other hand, notice is that political instability in a form of electoral competitiveness has less
influences on the Paris Club reschedules, when all variables are included in this analysis.
Their respective effects become statistically indistinguishable from zero. This may suggest
that if the effect of government concentration is significantly strong, the effect of political
instability on debt reschedules could be cancelled off.
4.7 Conclusion
The result of this chapter validates the view that debt policies and institutional factors
matter for debt sustainability. I finds empirical support, under some conditions, for the
hypothesis that under democracy, the parliamentary system is less likely to reschedule their
external debt than presidency scheme. It then finds that the probability of default is lower
in countries under government concentration. This finding may be seen as being in line
with a theoretical implication by Alesina and Drazen (1991) that fiscal adjustments tend
to be delayed under a divided government. I also find that the rescheduling propensity of a
country is increased by political instability such as electoral competitiveness. Interestingly,
in contrast, the occurrence of default seems to be lower when the executive is expected to
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remain in office for the next turn. Finally, the result shows that the Paris Club members
tend to give more support to those borrowers who are democratic than to those who are
not, while this has not been observed in the London Club. This supports the idea of
“democratic advantage” in international community.
Importantly, these results are robust to extensive controls and to numerous changes of
specifications and estimation method. Overall conclusion is that the choice of sample does
not have a major impact on the conclusions drawn.
More broadly, the findings in this chapter may pose important implications for the
lending strategies. Beyond providing a contribution to the existing literatures, these finding
has important implications for both academics and policy-makers who analyze the sovereign
defaults. As Kraay and Nehru (2006) mention, official creditors, including the World
Bank and the IMF, tend to focus exclusively on economic variables to assess a country’s
debt sustainability. The empirical results in this chapter imply that the evaluation of the
sustainability would be incomplete without taking into consideration the politics of debt
repayment.
On the other hand, the empirical results in this chapter is not complete. In part this is
due to data limitations, both in cross-country political economy data and sovereign default
data. This chapter is no exception, and is truly challenged by these limitations to identify
the interactions. Nevertheless, whatever small contributions can be made are valuable
to understanding the broader picture of sovereign default processes, especially in light of
recent events in European sovereign debt markets.
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Table 4.6: Random Effects Model: Total Debt Reschedules
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: All Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Random-effects Probit
Real growth (t-1) -0.639 -0.785 -0.816 -0.702 -0.759 -1.122 -0.637
(1.03) (1.22) (1.31) (1.02) (1.22) (1.41) (1.03)
Debt to GDP 0.102** 0.102** 0.104** 0.109** 0.093** 0.154*** 0.102**
(2.34) (2.34) (2.37) (2.23) (2.08) (2.69) (2.34)
Short term debt to total debt -3.250*** -3.206*** -3.223*** -2.977*** -3.212*** -3.542*** -3.251***
(6.93) (6.82) (6.91) (6.17) (6.89) (6.55) (6.93)
Reserves to total debt -1.397*** -1.388*** -1.417*** -1.481*** -1.513*** -1.380*** -1.398***
(5.78) (5.75) (5.87) (5.82) (5.99) (5.20) (5.78)
Debt service to exports 0.874*** 0.872*** 0.845*** 0.692*** 0.968*** 0.632** 0.875***
(3.67) (3.66) (3.54) (2.73) (3.98) (2.25) (3.67)
Parliamentary -0.120
(0.91)
Democracy 0.465**
(2.17)
Government Concentration -0.423***
(2.90)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.279**
(2.54)
Re-elected -0.308***
(2.64)
Election (t-1) 0.013
(0.14)
Constant -0.553*** -0.533*** -0.944*** -0.148 -0.745*** -0.247 -0.555***
(5.05) (4.80) (4.29) (0.87) (5.60) (1.54) (5.02)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
ρ 0.088 0.086 0.078 0.080 0.091 0.074 0.088
Log likelihood -950.34 -944.22 -936.03 -831.13 -945.01 -721.73 -950.33
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.7: Random Effects Model: Paris Club
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: Paris Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Random-effects Probit
Real growth (t-1) -0.762 -0.937 -0.990 -1.380* -0.880 -1.141 -0.748
(1.18) (1.39) (1.51) (1.92) (1.34) (1.35) (1.15)
Debt to GDP 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.136*** 0.188*** 0.143***
(3.37) (3.36) (3.39) (3.05) (3.13) (3.30) (3.37)
Short term debt to total debt -3.262*** -3.195*** -3.328*** -2.951*** -3.238*** -3.285*** -3.269***
(6.73) (6.59) (6.88) (5.87) (6.66) (5.86) (6.74)
Reserves to total debt -1.206*** -1.192*** -1.226*** -1.279*** -1.310*** -1.232*** -1.206***
(4.92) (4.89) (5.00) (4.92) (5.13) (4.49) (4.93)
Debt service to exports 0.601** 0.596** 0.619** 0.499* 0.696*** 0.371 0.606**
(2.47) (2.45) (2.53) (1.92) (2.78) (1.26) (2.49)
Parliamentary -0.176
(1.33)
Democracy 0.602**
(2.58)
Government Concentration -0.406***
(2.69)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.275**
(2.41)
Re-elected -0.191
(1.54)
Election (t-1) 0.087
(0.86)
Constant -0.718*** -0.690*** -1.230*** -0.332* -0.912*** -0.529*** -0.730***
(6.56) (6.23) (5.16) (1.92) (6.63) (3.20) (6.61)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
ρ 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.055 0.065 0.072 0.064
Log likelihood -841.36 -834.73 -829.01 -737.29 -836.22 -640.85 -840.99
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.8: Random Effects Model: London Club
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: London Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Random-effects Probit
Real growth (t-1) -0.609 -0.671 -0.528 -0.193 -0.686 -1.182 -0.621
(0.71) (0.75) (0.60) (0.20) (0.79) (1.08) (0.72)
Debt to GDP -0.072 -0.071 -0.070 -0.094 -0.082 -0.050 -0.071
(0.99) (0.98) (0.97) (1.16) (1.13) (0.62) (0.98)
Short term debt to total debt -2.132*** -2.194*** -2.051*** -1.812** -2.051*** -2.860*** -2.132***
(2.97) (3.03) (2.85) (2.51) (2.88) (3.18) (2.97)
Reserves to total debt -1.832*** -1.847*** -1.865*** -1.823*** -1.917*** 1.625*** -1.828***
(4.08) (4.11) (4.12) (4.06) (4.20) (3.48) (4.07)
Debt service to exports 1.129*** 1.128*** 1.060*** 0.980*** 1.188*** 1.029*** 1.127***
(3.63) (3.62) (3.33) (3.00) (3.82) (2.85) (3.63)
Parliamentary 0.198
(1.09)
Democracy 0.021
(0.07)
Government Concentration -0.196
(0.97)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.195
(1.25)
Re-elected -0.479***
(3.20)
Election (t-1) -0.062
(0.45)
Constant -1.290*** -1.312*** -1.298*** -1.076*** -1.416*** -0.839*** -1.283***
(7.93) (7.92) (4.22) (4.47) (7.43) (3.74) (7.85)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
ρ 0.167 0.167 0.171 0.125 0.152 0.117 0.168
Log likelihood -465.59 -464.39 -458.45 -410.17 -464.66 -344.60 -465.49
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
118
Table 4.9: Dynamic Random Effects Model
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: Total reschedules
Estimated model: Dynamic Random-effects Probit with Wooldridge estimators
Reschedule (t-1) 0.157* 0.163* 0.149* 0.058 0.166** 0.013 0.157*
(1.87) (1.94) (1.76) (0.64) (1.98) (0.13) (1.87)
Real Growth (t-1) -0.362 -0.498 -0.556 -0.358 -0.578 -0.696 -0.363
(0.57) (0.75) (0.86) (0.50) (0.90) (0.85) (0.57)
Debt to GDP 0.079 0.080 0.078 0.079 0.060 0.130* 0.079
(1.53) (1.56) (1.51) (1.34) (1.13) (1.84) (1.53)
Short-term Debt to Total Debt -3.687*** -3.653*** -3.637*** -3.472*** -3.498*** -4.003*** -3.686***
(7.20) (7.10) (7.07) (6.43) (6.77) (6.51) (7.20)
Reserves to Total Debt -1.422*** -1.382*** -1.426*** -1.517*** -1.485*** -1.410*** -1.419***
(5.64) (5.49) (5.68) (5.63) (5.75) (5.00) (5.63)
Debt Service to Exports 0.973*** 0.982*** 0.981*** 0.872*** 1.121*** 0.812*** 0.974***
(3.55) (3.58) (3.53) (2.97) (3.97) (2.46) (3.55)
Parliamentary -0.032
(0.16)
Democracy 0.400*
(1.74)
Government Concentration -0.472***
(2.78)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.316**
(2.49)
Re-elected -0.536***
(2.84)
Election (t-1) 0.002
(0.02)
Reschedule (t=0) 0.376** 0.405** 0.349** 0.303* 0.412*** 0.384** 0.375**
(2.41) (2.56) (2.26) (1.84) (2.58) (2.28) (2.40)
Xi (Political) -0.177 -0.071 0.168 -0.496** 0.397* 0.114
(0.70) (0.13) (0.50) (2.08) (1.66) (0.19)
Xi (Growth t-1) -4.333* -3.855 -3.490 -5.172* -4.703* -4.575 -4.200
(1.65) (1.46) (1.34) (1.82) (1.75) (1.48) (1.55)
Xi (Debt) 0.015 0.010 0.018 0.022 0.015 -0.042 0.017
(0.17) (0.12) (0.21) (0.23) (0.17) (0.40) (0.20)
Xi (Short term debt) 2.961*** 2.995*** 2.719*** 2.423*** 3.010*** 2.180** 2.945***
(3.68) (3.71) (3.31) (2.74) (3.63) (2.12) (3.64)
Xi (Reserve) -0.224 -0.230 -0.227 -0.261 -0.216 -0.288 -0.225
(1.56) (1.61) (1.59) (1.51) (1.52) (1.60) (1.57)
Xi (Debt Service) -0.486 -0.530 -0.572 -0.600 -0.652 -0.294 -0.487
(0.89) (0.97) (1.05) (1.00) (1.18) (0.46) (0.89)
Constant -0.643*** -0.626*** -0.906** -0.202 -0.504*** -0.342 -0.663***
(3.57) (3.49) (2.02) (0.60) (2.15) (1.31) (3.18)
Observations 2200 2188 2147 1906 2196 1705 2200
ρ 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.050 0.042 0.047 0.042
Log likelihood -936.45 -929.83 -923.85 -821.51 -930.72 -712.77 -936.43
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.10: Dynamic Random Effects Model: Alternative Estimators
I II III
Probit RE probit Wooldridge
Dependent variable: Total reschedules
Reschedule (t-1) 0.286*** 0.176** 0.157*
(3.68) (2.09) (1.87)
Real growth (t-1) -0.872 -0.699 -0.362
(1.47) (1.13) (0.57)
Debt to GDP 0.101*** 0.099** 0.079
(2.68) (2.30) (1.53)
Short term debt to total debt -2.452*** -3.017*** -3.687***
(6.16) (6.37) (7.20)
Reserves to total debt -1.275*** -1.333*** -1.422***
(5.73) (5.55) (5.64)
Debt service to exports 0.761*** 0.856*** 0.973***
(3.66) (3.64) (3.55)
Default (t=0) 0.376**
(2.41)
Xi (Growth t-1) -4.333*
(1.65)
Xi (Debt) 0.015
(0.17)
Xi (Short term debt) 2.961***
(3.68)
Xi (Reserve) -0.224
(1.56)
Xi (Debt Service) -0.486
(0.89)
Constant -0.658*** -0.614*** -0.643***
(6.91) (5.55) (3.57)
Observations 2200 2200 2200
ρ 0.071 0.090
Log likelihood -955.08 -948.18 -954.90
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.11: Robustness Check: Democracies
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: All reschedules of country-year observations with a polity score between +6 and +10
Estimated model: Pooled Probit
Real growth (t-1) 0.997 0.929 1.070 1.135 0.968 1.853 1.002
(0.83) (0.77) (0.88) (0.93) (0.80) (1.40) (0.83)
Debt to GDP 0.081 0.077 0.091 0.110* 0.079 0.128* 0.081
(1.41) (1.35) (1.57) (1.79) (1.39) (1.94) (1.41)
Short term debt to total debt -2.802*** -2.730*** -2.889*** -2.953*** -2.850*** -3.649*** -2.800***
(4.44) (4.31) (4.52) (4.60) (4.48) (4.99) (4.43)
Reserves to total debt -2.146*** -2.185*** -2.164*** -2.224*** -2.168*** -2.240*** -2.146***
(5.27) (5.31) (5.30) (5.36) (5.30) (5.19) (5.27)
Debt service to exports 0.530 0.558 0.463 0.528 0.557 0.402 0.529
(1.52) (1.61) (1.30) (1.48) (1.59) (1.05) (1.52)
Parliamentary -0.282*
(1.72)
Democracy 3.966
(0.86)
Government Concentration -0.353*
(1.82)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.227
(0.65)
Re-elected -0.312***
(2.60)
Election (t-1) 0.018
(0.13)
Constant -0.312* -0.267 -4.170 -0.028 -0.522 -0.046 -0.316*
(1.93) (1.63) (0.93) (0.12) (1.44) (0.24) (1.93)
Observations 842 842 842 820 842 788 842
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.119 0.116 0.126 0.116 0.144 0.115
Log likelihood -342.24 -340.70 -341.87 -329.04 -342.02 -309.11 -342.23
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.12: Robustness Check: Large T Sample
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent variable: All debt reschedules of countries which have 20 and more year-observations
Estimated model: Pooled Probit
Real growth (t-1) -1.195* -1.416** -1.307* -1.019 -1.258* -1.736* -1.190*
(1.78) (1.98) (1.92) (1.39) (1.86) (1.94) (1.77)
Debt to GDP 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.114** 0.117*** 0.148*** 0.123***
(2.91) (2.80) (2.82) (2.54) (2.76) (2.75) (2.91)
Short term debt to total debt -3.048*** -3.061*** -3.125*** -2.990*** -3.079*** -4.233*** -3.050***
(6.56) (6.57) (6.64) (6.05) (6.59) (7.06) (6.56)
Reserves to total debt -1.604*** -1.621*** -1.619*** -1.769*** -1.711*** -1.800*** -1.604***
(6.00) (6.06) (6.06) (6.27) (6.18) (5.71) (6.00)
Debt service to exports 0.709*** 0.700*** 0.677*** 0.514** 0.787*** 0.527* 0.710***
(3.14) (3.10) (2.96) (2.13) (3.43) (1.93) (3.14)
Parliamentary -0.234**
(2.02)
Democracy 0.330
(1.48)
Government Concentration -0.387***
(2.80)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.228**
(2.24)
Re-elected -0.338***
(3.45)
Election (t-1) 0.018
(0.17)
Constant -0.463*** -0.410*** -0.723*** -0.044 -0.615*** -0.009*** -0.466***
(4.24) (3.68) (3.21) (0.26) (4.76) (0.06) (4.22)
Observations 1879 1871 1826 1639 1879 1447 1879
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.108 0.105 0.106 0.107 0.128 0.104
Log likelihood -832.48 -826.18 -817.91 -735.99 -829.94 -617.24 -832.46
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.13: Robustness Check: Augmented specification
Pool Total Pool LC Pool PC RE Total RE LC RE PC
Dependent variable: Total, London Club or Paris Club debt reschedules
Estimated model: Pooled Probit or Random-effects Probot
Real growth (t-1) -1.244 -0.886 -1.573* -1.113 -0.356 -1.640*
(1.52) (0.76) (1.84) (1.32) (0.28) (1.84)
Debt to GDP 0.145*** -0.079 0.169*** 0.161*** -0.070 0.184***
(2.70) (0.97) (3.11) (2.69) (0.78) (3.05)
Short term debt to total debt -3.302*** -3.194*** -3.159*** -3.526*** -2.698*** -3.283***
(6.65) (2.87) (6.02) (6.52) (3.00) (5.78)
Reserves to total debt -1.637*** -1.793*** -1.485*** -1.596*** -1.823*** -1.409***
(6.12) (4.03) (5.30) (5.74) (3.84) (4.85)
Debt service to exports 0.476* 0.901*** 0.368 0.510* 0.843** 0.440
(1.79) (2.60) (1.33) (1.77) (2.21) (1.45)
Parliamentary -0.107 0.282* -0.200 -0.081 0.306 -0.188
(0.84) (1.65) (1.47) (0.54) (1.51) (1.17)
Democracy 0.496* -0.102 0.669** 0.523* -0.249 0.756**
(1.67) (0.29) (2.00) (1.68) (0.66) (2.13)
Government Concentration -0.434*** -0.269 -0.383** -0.436*** -0.257 -0.386**
(2.88) (1.33) (2.40) (2.65) (1.15) (2.20)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.317** 0.382 0.266 0.294* 0.321 0.272
(2.01) (1.63) (1.61) (1.74) (1.26) (1.53)
Re-elected -0.140 -0.489*** 0.037 -0.209* -0.547*** -0.019
(1.37) (3.60) (0.33) (1.70) (3.43) (0.14)
Election (t-1) -0.112 -0.68 -0.069 -0.105 -0.056 -0.064
(1.07) (0.47) (0.63) (0.99) (0.37) (0.57)
Constant -0.568 -0.791* -1.050*** -0.553 -0.589 -1.150***
(1.56) (1.69) (2.62) (1.41) (1.14) (2.65)
Observations 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.106 0.114
rho 0.050 0.074 0.056
Log likelihood -684.52 -319.11 -604.27 -681.58 -317.60 601.51
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Data of Debt Reschedule
The countries and the numbers of reschedules for Total, Paris Club (PC), and London Club
(LC) are shown in Table 4.14 below. Note that the number of year observation for Total is
not necessarily equivalent to the sum of PC and LC reschedules. Since this is annal data,
Total get only one if PC and LC reschedules happened in a given year.
Table 4.14: List of Countries and Reschedules: 1975-2010
Country Total PC LC Country Total PC LC
Afghanistan 2 2 0 Liberia 7 6 1
Angola 1 1 0 Sri Lanka 1 1 0
Albania 4 3 1 Morocco 7 6 3
Argentina 7 5 4 Moldova 3 1 2
Burundi 3 3 0 Madagascar 12 11 4
Benin 6 6 0 Mexico 7 3 5
Burkina Faso 5 5 0 Macedonia 3 2 1
Bulgaria 3 3 1 Mali 8 8 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 2 1 Mozambique 9 8 2
Belize 1 0 1 Mauritania 9 8 1
Bolivia 8 7 2 Malawi 5 5 2
Brazil 7 4 6 Niger 11 10 3
Central African Rep. 9 9 0 Nigeria 9 5 6
Chile 7 3 5 Nicaragua 10 6 5
Cote d’Ivoire 10 9 2 Pakistan 3 3 1
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Country Total PC LC Country Total PC LC
Cameroon 9 7 2 Panama 4 2 3
Congo 15 9 8 Peru 8 6 3
Comoro Islands 2 2 0 Philippines 8 6 4
Costa Rica 6 5 3 Poland 12 5 7
Cuba 4 2 3 Paraguay 1 0 1
Djibouti 2 2 0 Romania 3 2 3
Dominican Republic 6 4 4 Rwanda 6 5 2
Algeria 4 2 2 Russia 3 3 0
Ecuador 11 8 6 Sudan 5 4 1
Egypt 2 2 0 Senegal 17 15 4
Ethiopia 6 5 1 Sierra Leone 11 10 1
Gabon 8 8 2 El Salvador 1 1 0
Georgia 2 2 0 Somalia 2 2 0
Ghana 4 4 0 Slovenia 1 0 1
Guinea 9 7 2 Chad 4 4 0
Gambia 5 4 1 Togo 13 12 2
Guinea-Bissau 5 5 0 Trinidad-Tobago 2 2 1
Equatorial Guinea 5 4 1 Turkey 5 3 3
Grenada 2 1 1 Tanzania 8 7 1
Guatemala 1 1 0 Uganda 10 9 1
Guyana 7 6 2 Ukraine 3 0 3
Honduras 7 6 1 Uruguay 5 0 5
Croatia 2 1 1 Venezuela 3 0 3
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Country Total PC LC Country Total PC LC
Haiti 3 3 0 Vietnam 2 1 1
Indonesia 5 5 0 Yemen 3 3 1
Iraq 2 1 1 Yugoslavia 5 4 4
Jamaica 10 7 7 South Africa 3 0 3
Jordan 7 6 1 DR Congo 12 12 0
Kenya 4 3 1 Zambia 10 9 1
Kyrgyzstan 2 2 0
Cambodia 1 1 0 Total 507 396 168
4.8.2 Granger Causality Tests
In order to examine whether the Paris Club (PC) reschedules tend to precede the London
Club (LC) reschedules, I use Granger-causality tests, which has been established as a
widely-used analytical tool in applied economics.
According to the definition of causality by Granger (1969), a stationary time series xt
is said to ‘granger cause’ another stationary time series yt if the inclusion of past values of
xt significantly reduces the predictive error variance of yt, rather than using the history of
y alone. This means that it would be more relevant to be referred to the term ‘improved
predictability’ rather than ‘causality’. Thurman and Fisher (1988), for instance, tried to
ridicule the concept by applying it to the ‘chicken-egg problem’, showing that eggs ‘cause’
chicken in the Granger sense but not vice versa.
In econometric practice, Granger-causality tests are carried out by regressing yt on its
own lags and on lags of xt. Following literatures, e.g. Konya (2006), the possibility of
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Granger causality between PC and LC can be examined using the bivariate finite-order
vector autoregressive (VAR) model as follows:
yit = α1,t +
ki∑
j=1
β1,i,jyi,t−j +
ki∑
j=1
γ1,i,jxi,t−j + 1,i,t (4.10)
xit = α2,t +
ki∑
j=1
β2,i,jyi,t−j +
ki∑
j=1
γ2,i,jxi,t−j + 2,i,t, (4.11)
where index i refers to the country (i = 1, ..., N), t to the time period (t = 1, ..., T ), and j
to the lag. 1,i,t and 2,i,t are supposed to be white-noise errors that may be correlated for
a given country, but not across countries. Also it is assumed that y and x are stationary,
or cointegrated.
The null hypothesis that xt does not Granger-cause yt or vice versa amounts to testing
whether γ1 and β2 are zero for t = 1, ..., T : (i) in country i, there is one-way Granger
causality from x to y if not all γ1 in (4.11) are zero but all β2 in (4.11) are zero, (ii) there
is one-way Granger causality from y to x if all γ1 in (4.11) are zero but not all β2 in (4.11)
are zero, (iii) there is two-way Granger causality between y and x if neither all β2 nor γ1
are zero, and (iv) there is no Granger causality between y and x if all β2 and γ1 are zero.
Since for a given year the two equations have the same predetermined variables, the OLS
estimators of the parameters are consistent and asymptotically efficient. The test statistic
is calculated from the sum of squared residuals of the unrestricted equation. Then an
F-test, which provides Wald statistics Wi, is used to examine the null hypothesis.
The first step I take is to check the integrated properties of the series for all countries.
As Granger-causality tests require stationary data, all time series need to be tested for the
presence of unit roots. Table 4.15 reports the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) tests on the
levels (no unit root) and first differences (one unit root) of the series. The null hypothesis is
that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the variable is generated
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by a stationary process. Many country series strongly reject the null hypothesis, while
some panels (32 countries) can not even if taking the first difference and second difference.
There may be a case where the country has no London Club (or Paris Club) reschedule
in the observed years. As a result, these counties are excluded from the panel estimation
models for the Granger causality tests. Accordingly, the maximum order of integration in
the VAR system is determined for each country.
Secondly, we have to specify the number of lags, ki. Since the results from the causality
test could be sensitive to the lag structure, determination of the optimal lag length is
crucial. Insufficient lags yield autocorrelated errors (and incorrect test statistics), while
too many lags reduce the power of the test. While there is no simple rule to decide the
maximal lag, following Konya (2006), I do not allow maximal lags to vary across countries,
for reducing computational burden. I then estimate the system for each possible pair
respectively, by assuming from 1 to 4 lags, and choose the combinations minimizing the
Akaike Bayesian Criterion. I allow the lag structure to vary across countries, but keeping
it the same across equations. In Table 4.16, ki is given as the number of the appropriate
lag orders in level VAR systems for country i.
The results of Granger causality test are shown in Table 4.16. This presents that both
null hypothesis of “Granger no causality from PC to LC” and “Granger no causality from
LC to PC” cannot be rejected even at 10% level for 17 out of 48 countries. On the other
hand, there is strong evidence that rejects the null hypothesis that PC does not cause LC
significantly for 21 countries, while 20 countries support the LC led hypothesis. Considering
strong empirical support for two-way Granger causality between PC and LC reschedules in
10 countries, overall, this study does not provide strong evidence supporting the argument
that PC reschedule is an important determinant of LC reschedule in Granger sense. This
study also highlights that the causality between PC and LC differ across countries. Possible
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reasons for the mixed results are differences in debt structure and the degree of market
access among countries.
Results may be constrained by the technical limitation. Spurious causality could arise
in a bivariate setting when both variables have common causes that are not included in the
regression equation. In this case, even if there is no other relationship between xt and yt,
the test will misleadingly find Granger-causality. If all common cause variables are included
in the regression as control variables, however, the spurious causation between xt and yt
would vanish. Hsiao (1982) suggests that such multivariate settings can help to alleviate
the problem of spurious causality. As Kar et al. (2011) notes, testing for the cross-sectional
dependence in a panel study could lead to selecting the appropriate estimator.
Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Afghanistan 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Angola 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Albania 0.000* - 0.000* -
Argentina 0.000* - 0.000* -
Burundi 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Benin 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Burkina Faso 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Bulgaria 0.000* - 0.000* -
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.000* - 0.000* -
Belize 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
Bolivia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Brazil 0.000* - 0.000* -
Central African Rep. 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Chile 0.000* - 0.000* -
Cote d’Ivoire 0.000* - 0.000* -
Cameroon 0.000* - 0.007* -
Congo 0.000* - 0.001 -
Comoro Islands 0.007* - 1.000 1.000
Costa Rica 0.000* - 0.000* -
Cuba 0.007* - 0.061 0.029*
Djibouti 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Dominican Republic 0.000* - 0.000* -
Algeria 0.007* - 0.000* -
Ecuador 0.000* - 0.000* -
Egypt 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Ethiopia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Gabon 0.000* - 0.000* -
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Georgia 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Ghana 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Guinea 0.000* - 0.000* -
Gambia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Guinea-Bissau 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Equatorial Guinea 0.000* - 0.000* -
Grenada 0.000* - 0.000* -
Guatemala 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Guyana 0.000* - 0.000* -
Honduras 0.000* - 0.000* -
Croatia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Haiti 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Indonesia 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Iraq 0.000* - 0.000* -
Jamaica 0.000* - 0.000* -
Jordan 0.000* - 0.000* -
Kenya 0.000* - 0.000* -
Kyrgyzstan 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Cambodia 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Liberia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Sri Lanka 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Morocco 0.000* - 0.000* -
Moldova 0.000* - 0.000* -
Madagascar 0.000* - 0.000* -
Mexico 0.000* - 0.000* -
Macedonia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Mali 0.001 - 1.000 1.000
Mozambique 0.000* - 0.000* -
Mauritania 0.000* - 0.000* -
Malawi 0.000* - 0.000* -
Niger 0.000* - 0.000* -
Nigeria 0.000* - 0.002* -
Nicaragua 0.000* - 0.000* -
Pakistan 0.000* - 0.000* -
Panama 0.000* - 0.000* -
Peru 0.000* - 0.000* -
Philippines 0.000* - 0.000* -
Poland 0.000* - 0.000* -
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Paraguay 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
Romania 0.007* - 0.000* -
Rwanda 0.102 0.257 0.087 0.021*
Russia 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Sudan 0.004* - 0.000* -
Senegal 0.000* - 0.000* -
Sierra Leone 0.000* - 0.000* -
El Salvador 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Somalia 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Slovenia 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
Chad 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Togo 0.000* - 0.000* -
Trinidad-Tobago 0.007* - 0.000* -
Turkey 0.061 0.029* 0.000* -
Tanzania 0.000* - 0.000* -
Uganda 0.000* - 0.000* -
Ukraine 1.000 1.000 0.605 0.029*
Uruguay 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
Venezuela 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.15: The Results of ADF Tests
Country Paris Club London Club
Levels
First
differences Levels
First
differences
Vietnam 0.000* - 0.000* -
Yemen 0.000* - 0.000* -
Yugoslavia 0.005* - 0.005* -
South Africa 1.000 1.000 0.000* -
DR Congo 0.000* - 1.000 1.000
Zambia 0.000* - 0.000* -
Note: The values in Table are Mackinnon (1996) one sided p-values.
*Rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% at significant level.
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Table 4.16: The Results of Granger Causality Tests
Country ki H0: PC does not cause LC H0: LC does not cause PC
Wi pi Wi pi
Albania 4 3.850 0.014*** 3.590 0.019***
Argentina 2 2.960 0.067* 2.000 0.152
Bolivia 3 2.920 0.052* 2.430 0.086*
Brazil 4 1.370 0.273 1.540 0.221
Chile 4 0.980 0.438 7.700 0.000***
Cote d’Ivoire 1 0.820 0.373 0.840 0.366
Cameroon 3 1.500 0.236 2.180 0.113
Congo 1 0.000 0.974 3.900 0.057*
Costa Rica 4 1.930 0.136 0.610 0.658
Dominican Republic 1 7.140 0.012** 0.350 0.560
Ecuador 1 0.160 0.695 0.010 0.914
Ethiopia 4 1.570 0.212 1.710 0.180
Gabon 1 0.430 0.516 7.120 0.012**
Guinea 1 1.200 0.281 0.990 0.326
Gambia 1 0.120 0.729 0.080 0.774
Equatorial Guinea 4 3.550 0.020** 6.470 0.001***
Guyana 3 6.990 0.001*** 0.400 0.751
Honduras 1 0.200 0.661 5.750 0.022**
Jamaica 3 0.200 0.894 6.070 0.003***
Jordan 1 5.670 0.023** 5.480 0.025**
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.16: The Results of Granger Causality Tests
Country ki H0: PC does not cause LC H0: LC does not cause PC
Wi pi Wi pi
Kenya 4 2.810 0.047** 3.360 0.025**
Liberia 3 7.650 0.001*** 3.540 0.027**
Morocco 4 3.800 0.015** 4.870 0.005***
Madagascar 4 0.330 0.853 1.810 0.158
Mexico 2 11.640 0.000*** 16.040 0.000***
Macedonia 3 8.750 0.000*** 8.710 0.000***
Mozambique 4 1.010 0.421 0.180 0.949
Mauritania 1 3.780 0.060* 0.240 0.626
Malawi 1 5.200 0.029** 1.090 0.304
Niger 1 13.460 0.001*** 0.040 0.850
Nigeria 2 1.100 0.347 5.190 0.011**
Nicaragua 1 1.360 0.252 1.060 0.309
Pakistan 2 0.060 0.939 5.540 0.009***
Panama 1 0.060 0.809 0.100 0.755
Peru 1 0.500 0.485 0.670 0.420
Philippines 3 11.750 0.000*** 0.650 0.588
Poland 1 11.470 0.002*** 8.080 0.008***
Romania 3 10.850 0.000*** 0.030 0.994
Sudan 3 14.850 0.000*** 0.300 0.825
Senegal 4 2.110 0.109 3.230 0.029**
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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Table 4.16: The Results of Granger Causality Tests
Country ki H0: PC does not cause LC H0: LC does not cause PC
Wi pi Wi pi
Sierra Leone 1 2.730 0.108 2.440 0.128
Togo 1 0.910 0.347 0.210 0.649
Trinidad-Tobago 1 0.030 0.869 17.500 0.000***
Tanzania 2 2.050 0.146 0.150 0.862
Uganda 1 3.190 0.083* 0.330 0.571
Yemen 4 24.200 0.000*** 1.740 0.174
Yugoslavia 3 1.840 0.163 21.540 0.000***
Zambia 1 0.330 0.571 0.440 0.511
*Significant at a 10% level, **significant at a 5% level, and *** significant at a 1% level.
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